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1 -

SAC, WFO

Director, FBI

7/19/73

266,053

DATE 9-16-86 INITIALS [Signature]

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

~~TOP SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

Enclosed for recipients are

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

9-16-86
Classified by [Signature]
Declassify on: OADR
#266053

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

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Enclosures - 7

- 2 - Los Angeles (Enclosures-7)
- 2 - New York (Enclosures-7)
- 2 - San Francisco (Enclosures-7)
- 2 - St. Louis (Enclosures-7)

RAM: jlb
(12)

MAIL ROOM [] TELETYPE UNIT []

~~TOP SECRET~~

MAILED 23
JUL 18 1973

FBI

FSP [Signature]


DOWNGRADED TO
SECRET
Date 7/27/14

- Assoc. Dir.
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin.
- Comp. Syst.
- Files & Com.
- Gen. Inv.
- Ident.
- Inspection
- Intell.
- Laboratory
- Plan. & Eval.
- Rec. Mgmt.
- Training
- Legal Coun.
- Off. Serv.
- Off. & Com.
- Research
- Press Off.
- Telephone Rm.
- Director Sec'y

Letter to WFO

Re: Republic of Korea (ROK)
Intelligence Activities
in the United States

~~TOP SECRET~~



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This matter has been discussed extensively with
State Department via Liaison

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Referral/Consult

Therefore, Bureau is undertaking the effort
of attempting to determine if persons residing in the United States
are carrying out activities on behalf of the South Korean Govern-
ment which would be in violation of the Foreign Agents Regis-
tration Act of 1938, as amended.

Bureau does not have a copy of the Washington Star
article which apparently precipitated this entire matter. WFO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Letter to WFO

Re: Republic of Korea (ROK)
Intelligence Activities
in the United States

~~TOP SECRET~~

(U) should obtain a copy of it, review the article for logical leads, [and conduct any investigation deemed necessary which does not involve a direct investigation of a foreign diplomatic official.] Unless some reason exists which would make such inadvisable, WFO should arrange an interview with [] to determine if he has information concerning participation by non-diplomatic personnel in the harassment of Korean citizens.

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San Francisco should obtain a copy of the article appearing in the San Francisco Chronicle and cover any logical leads which would assist in determining if persons residing in the United States have been carrying out activities on behalf of South Korea in violation of the Registration Act. If your files contain no information which would preclude an interview of [] such interview should be conducted along the lines specified to WFO in the interview of [] No diplomatic personnel are to be contacted. []



Referral/Consult

St. Louis should report any information available concerning the confrontation in its territory and should abide by the instructions set out for WFO and San Francisco. Los Angeles should report any information available concerning [] who apparently is the individual described as []

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[] If there is any indication he was accompanied by non-diplomatic personnel while he was involved in the demonstration at San Francisco, the identities of such individuals should be set out also, along with information from your files regarding them.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Letter to WFO
Re: Republic of Korea (ROK)
Intelligence Activities
in the United States

~~TOP SECRET~~

Since [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] should furnish any information it possesses concerning this matter and [REDACTED] should conduct any indicated investigation which does not directly involve a current diplomatic official. (U) (S)

(U) All offices should report pertinent information by letterhead memorandum. WFO and San Francisco should include the substance of the individual newspaper articles previously mentioned or, if not too lengthy, the exact duplicates of the articles. (U) [In the event it appears desirable that direct investigation of an individual diplomat be instituted, Bureau should be expeditiously advised so that State Department clearance for such an investigation may be initiated.] (S) As has been indicated previously, it is felt that State Department has primary responsibility for policing the activities of South Korean diplomats in this instance [and it is not desired that we undertake massive investigations of South Korean diplomats unless such appears absolutely necessary.] (U) (S)

A review of Bureau files fails to indicate that any complaints along the lines involved herein have been received prior to the recent flurry of incidents. It is hoped that this matter can be resolved without unnecessary investigation and that pertinent material can be provided State Department without undue delay. Recipients are requested to afford this matter prompt attention to assure that the investigation does not continue indefinitely. Your cooperation in expediting these requests would be appreciated.

~~TOP SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NR001 WF CODE

9:37PM NITEL 8/19/73 JBC

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: INTD)

FROM SAC, WFO (125-NEW)

AUG 19 1973

TELETYPE

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC

DECLASSIFICATION

AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:

FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1-human)

DATE 04-05-2012

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Classified by *[signature]*
Declassify on: OADR

(S) 9

Assoc. Dir. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Files & Com. _____
In. Inv. _____
Int. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Cong. Serv. _____
Corr. & Crm. _____
Research _____
Press Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

DEMONSTRATION AGAINST SOUTH KOREAN EMBASSY, 8/19/73, WASHINGTON,

D.C., IS-KOREA. 00:WFO

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

IN THE U.S. - RA - SOUTH KOREA

[REDACTED] WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST,
ADVISED THIS DATE A GROUP OF KOREAN RESIDENTS OF THE WASHINGTON
AREA HAD GATHERED AT FLORIDA AVENUE AND 16TH STREET NW TO LEAD A
MOTORCADE PROTESTING AGAINST THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT AND EMBASSY.

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE UNIT ADVISED THE
MOTORCADE PARTICIPANTS GATHERED AT MERIDIAN HILL PARK, 16TH AND
BELMONT STREETS, NW AT 5:30PM, THIS DATE WITH ABOUT 150 PERSONS
PARTICIPATING. THE GROUP DEPARTED THE PARK IN 94 VEHICLES AND PARADED
THROUGH THE CITY AND PASSED THE SOUTH KOREAN EMBASSY AT 2320 MASSA-
CHUSETTS AVENUE NW. THE MOTORCADE CONTINUED WEST ON MASSACHUSETTS
AVENUE AND DISBANDED WITH NO INCIDENTS AT 6:55PM.

THE GROUP HAD OBTAINED APPROPRIATE PERMIT FOR DEMONSTRATION.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

*CC to 105 - Republic of Korea (Pak)
Intelligence Activities in U.S.
RA - South Korea*

NOT RECORDED

AUG 27 1973

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES ADVISED OF DEMONSTRATION, HOWEVER,

ALL WERE AWARE AT TIME OF NOTIFICATION: MPD INTELLIGENCE.

U.S. SECRET SERVICE-AGENT

WFO WILL OBTAIN COPY OF APPLICATION.

END

DLM FBI HQ CLR

AUG 31 1973

100 55, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

[signature]

AUG 21 1973

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
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OTHERWISE

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-249806

b1

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1-human)
DATE 04-05-2012

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/4/73

FROM : SAC, WFO (97-2034) (C)

9/16/86
Classified by *Soyakumae*
Declassify on: OADR 266,033

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT AT SOUTH KOREA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

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LVF

Re Bureau letter to WFO, 7/19/73.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau, are five copies of an LHM, dated and captioned as above. Copies of this LHM are being sent to Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, and St. Louis for information purposes.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In view of the fact that [REDACTED] nor [REDACTED] provide any information concerning the identities of any non-diplomatic personnel in the Washington, D.C. area acting for the Korean Government, nor any specific information that Korean Embassy personnel are acting beyond the scope of their official status in the United States.

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- 2 - Bureau (Enc. 5)
1 - Los Angeles (Info) (Enc. 1)
1 - New York (Info) (Enc. 1)
1 - San Francisco (Info) (Enc. 1)
1 - St. Louis (Info) (Enc. 1)
4 - WFO

REC 17 105-247904-5

EX-112

SEP 5 1973

(1-105-117018)

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LJT:pjf
(10)
58 OCT 3 1973

1cc encl to
DIA (Liaison)
10-23-74
HCD/rep

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DOC 10/2/73



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WFO 2034

States, it is not felt that further investigation of Korean personnel be warranted at this time.

Actions of Vice Consul, Young Sik BAE, in Los Angeles, based on information furnished by [] do not appear substantive enough to warrant further investigation; however, recommendations are being left to the discretion of the Los Angeles Office as information in the possession of that office may warrant other considerations. C

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(U) While alleging that [] and [] do cooperate with Korean Embassy officials, [] was not able to provide any information that these [] individuals have been involved in the harassment of any local Koreans. The files of WFO contain no information of a derogatory nature concerning [] X

(U) Other than information furnished by [] concerning [] referred to in the enclosed LHM, which [] considered a form of harassment, [] was unable to furnish additional information concerning the identities of any individuals who are actually being harassed by ROK/CIA. C

In view of the above, WFO is taking no further action in this matter at this time and is placing this case in a closed status.

(U) The interview of [] was conducted by Special Agents CHARLES B. FINDLEY and [] C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)
DATE 04-05-2012

AUG 24 1973

TELETYPE

~~SECRET~~

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Cong. Serv.	_____
Corr. & Crm.	_____
Research	_____
Press Off.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

FTB004 447AM 08-24-73 MRF

STATE 049

2:45 PM URGENT 8/24/73 RAR

TO DIRECTOR FBI NR 205-23

FROM LEGAT TOKYO (109-2) 2 P

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Classified by *SP4CJ/mr*
Declassify on: *OADR*

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FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)

Intelligence Activities in the

STATES

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109-12-265-495

ORIGINAL FILED IN

END PAGE ONE

cc to 105-247904

~~SECRET~~

5-24

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, ST. LOUIS (97-150) RUC

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

DATE: 9/5/73

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-16-86 BY SP-90/mre

Re WFO letter to St. Louis dated 7/19/73.

On 8/5/73, [redacted] (Protect Identity), [redacted] advised that there is no record on file in that agency regarding a "St. Louis incident" involving South Korean Nationals or the ROK CIA referred to in referenced communication.

[redacted] stated that only two incidents involving persons of Korean extraction have been recorded [redacted]. One occurred when a Korean National was murdered in 1966, in a common bar room brawl. The second occurred in March of 1973, when a person of Korean extraction opened a wig shop [redacted] Mo., a racially mixed St. Louis suburb. The opening of the business resulted in opposition by a black and a white merchant who were competitors in the neighborhood. Leaflets were issued by these persons protesting Nixon Administration policies which permitted Koreans to compete with established American businessmen. [redacted] stated that the protesting businessmen were identified, interviewed, and characterized to their satisfaction as established business people interested in nothing more than protecting themselves from excessive competition in the wig market.

On 8/5/73, [redacted] St. Louis County Police Dept., Intelligence Unit, advised there is no record on file in that agency concerning any incident involving Korean Nationals.

2 - Bureau (AM)
2 - WFO (RM)
2 - St. Louis
DRS:kmf
(6)

REC-19

EX-103

105-247904-60

SEP 10 1973



57 OCT 3 1973

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

On 8/13/73, a search of the St. Louis Division indices failed to reveal any reference to any incident concerning Korean Nationals.

On 8/13/73, it was determined that an Associated Press (AP) article appeared in the 6/10/73, issue of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, a daily newspaper in St. Louis, entitled "U. S. Checking Reports on Korean Agents." The article stated that the United States is attempting to verify that agents of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) interfered with at least two meetings of Koreans in this country, one in St. Louis. These attempts were described by an unnamed spokesman for the State Dept. as attempts to interfere with free assembly. The St. Louis incident was described as occurring in April of 1973, when 120 members of the association of Korean Christian Scholars met at Concordia Seminary of the Missouri Synod Lutheran Church. The meeting was to discuss, among other things, the arrest by the Korean CIA of a Korean Presbyterian pastor in Seoul.

✓ KIM DAC JUNG, a former Korean opposition presidential candidate, was scheduled to address the group. At one point during the meeting the [redacted] was called from the podium to receive a phone call. The caller was an agent of the Korean CIA, and the call was interpreted as an effort to intimidate them. The other incident was described as occurring in San Francisco when hecklers attempted to disrupt a meeting at which KIM DAC JUNG spoke. When officers seized a heckler, a Korean diplomat intervened.

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4 The article quoted JAI HYON LEE, who resigned as head cultural and information attache for Korea and later asked to remain in the United States, as saying that CIA agents work out of the Korean Embassy and consulates across the United States conducting illegal surveillances and intimidating Korean residents.

SL 97-150

On 8/19/73, a second article appeared in the
Post-Dispatch, and is set out in its entirety as follows:

Seoul's CIA Accused Of Harassment

By WILLIAM FREIVOGEL
Of the Post-Dispatch Staff

When Mrs. Wi Jo Kang answered the telephone in her home on the grounds of Concordia Seminary last April 14, she found herself speaking with the deputy director of the eighth bureau of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency.

The conversation that ensued is not likely to be recorded as one of the dramatic moments in the history of such cloak-and-dagger affairs. But officials of the Department of State interpret it as evidence that South Korean "operatives" in the United States are trying increasingly to intimidate Koreans living here.

The State Department has asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate the incident and a number of others around the country.

The stepped-up activity of Korean agents in this country appears to be a response to the increasing dissatisfaction with which Korean-born persons living here view the regime of President Chung Hee Park.

The early evening phone call to Mrs. Kang's large brick house at 10 Seminary Terrace was made in the midst of a national meeting of the Association of Christian Scholars.

Speaking at that meeting was Dae Jung Kim, the leader of the major opposition party in South Korea and the focus of opposition to Park's government.

Since Park declared martial law last year, Kim has spent most of his time in self-imposed exile, here and in Japan. That exile ended earlier this month, when Kim was kidnapped and forcibly returned to Korea. State Department officials privately confirm what Korean-Americans firmly believe—that Kim was kidnapped by the Korean CIA.

Kim's appearance at the

meeting here was arranged by Won Mo Dong, a professor of political science at Southern Methodist University in Dallas. And it was Dong who the Korean operative asked for when Mrs. Kang answered the phone.

Also on the telephone during the call was a Mr. Son, who described himself as a member of the Korean consulate in New York. Son told Mrs. Kang that the other man on the phone was the Korean CIA deputy director in Seoul.

The eighth bureau of the Korean CIA, which that deputy director headed, has responsibility for all of North America and Europe, the Post-Dispatch was told.

Abba-Koreans had called Mrs. Kang because her husband, a Korean-born professor at Concordia, was participating in the conference.

Mrs. Kang told the operative in New York that Dong was not at her home but that she could get a message to him. The deputy director in Seoul and the consulate employee then conferred for a time and told Mrs. Kang that they would call back.

Dong said he had been "very perturbed" when he had heard about the call but had agreed to go to Mrs. Kang's home and wait. The call never came.

Nevertheless, the CIA or so

Korean scholars who were present debated late into the night about the significance of the early evening call.

In the end, they unanimously adopted a resolution describing the call as a "most blatant infringement of the freedoms of speech and assembly." They called it "intimidation" and said it was "deplorable and intolerable."

Dong was asked how he could be certain the phone call was an attempt at intimidation. He

said, "Every grown-up in and out of South Korea knows what the Korean CIA has been doing. This intelligence agency has been intimidating the entire nation."

"They have their agents all over the United States, including one or two in Chicago. They are not at all like the United States CIA. They are a secret police, like the Russian secret police and the German one before it."

"These people in the consulates have nothing to do with diplomacy." They have nothing

to do but to harass the Korean citizens," he said.

Nothing in the unwritten rules of diplomacy prohibits a government from sending spies to another country as part of its diplomatic mission. In fact, it is a common practice.

The euphemism by which these "operatives" are normally classified is "security officer," knowledgeable sources say. The diplomats say this classification means that the officers are looking after the security of the embassy, but they seldom are.

The Koreans appear to have adopted precisely that cover. The chief of the Korean Intelligence Agency in the U.S., identified by the Koreans as Sang Ho Lee, maintains that he is "responsible for security affairs in the embassy."

That is not the only cover under which he operates. Knowledgeable sources say Lee is really Dong Won Yang, a former officer in the South Korean Marines and the man who once masterminded the kidnapping of 17 Korean dissidents from West Germany.

He was reported the Lee flew to Seoul on July 27, only 12

days before the disappearance of Kim, the opposition leader. But he denies any knowledge of the matter.

A little more than a week before that trip, two other South Korean embassy officials based in Washington, flew to Asia.

In addition to their embassy in Washington, the South Koreans have consulates in Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Houston, Honolulu and Chicago.

An embassy official was asked how many employees the Koreans had in this country. He replied, "I really could not say, but I am sure it is not too many."

One reason for his vague reply may be the fact that the United States keeps no records on the presence of some of the operatives.

For example, the New York Times reported that the former director of the Korean CIA, Kim Hyung Wook, is in the vicinity of New York, even though officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service say they have no record of his having entered the country.

Dong, the political science professor, said he had "rom-

pressed" opposition to the South Korean government before Park declared martial law last year.

"But when he did away with the constitution, which he himself had amended," Dong said, "I and many other Koreans here got unhappy with my native land."

"Most Koreans here had not been very political," he said. "In fact, they were apolitical, if anything."

Before the incident in St. Louis last April, Dong said he had planned on returning to Korea. "But immediately after that, I decided to apply for U.S. citizenship, and I have. I could not go out of the country now because of fear of CIA harassment."

This weekend, Dong is traveling to Washington to participate in a rally asking that Kim be allowed to leave South Korea if he so wishes.

Ironically, the only Korean here who disputes the charge that the incident in St. Louis was an attempt at intimidation is Kang, at whose home the call was received.

Although Kang asked that he not be quoted, he said he saw no intimidation by the incident.

Nevertheless, some Korean scholars believe that Kang's attitude is in itself proof of the power of the CIA. The professor's wife runs an oriental gift shop on Clayton Road and sells items from Korea. For that reason, the Kangs are said to be dependent on the Korean government for their livelihood.

In addition to the St. Louis incident, a number of other activities by the Korean CIA have been reported around the country.

In New York, the Korean consul, In Duk Son, described as a Korean operative, on April 29 followed demonstrators protesting against the Park military regime and had them photographed.

In Washington, Jai Hyon Lee, former diplomat, received a letter July 28 from a friend in Seoul, which in admonishing tones advised him to stay out of politics. Lee said it was obviously dictated by the Korean intelligence agency. The next day, in Washington, Young Chee Kang, a reporter, received a letter from his mother in Seoul, accusing him of collaborating with Kim Dai Jung, who opposes Park. She wrote that if Kang continued, her life and the lives of his sister and two brothers were in jeopardy. Kang said: "It read as if it was dictated to her."

A week later, in Washington, Sung Nam Chang, publisher of the Korean-American paper, Free Republic, got a letter from his brother in Seoul warning of the consequences of continued political opposition.

"They are becoming emboldened, more and more," Kang said.

And other South Koreans in this country said that they were considering renouncing their South Korean citizenship as a means of protecting relatives from reprisals in their homeland.

Lee has already taken this step. He is 47 years old and formerly was chief cultural and information attache in the South Korean Embassy. He sought political asylum in the U.S. June 5. He quit in protest against orders to send back two of his former aids who had decided also against returning.

Contending that he has no special political persuasion, Lee has nevertheless joined the current campaign of Korean dissidents to defend the opposition leader Kim. In an interview he said: "Koreans living in the United States, whether citizens or not, feel unfree in the streets day and night" because of the Korean intelligence agency.

In the Western intelligence community the Korean agency "rates good points among those who are good east of Suez," as one operative put it. But its official responsibility for external and internal operations distinguishes it from other intelligence agencies, it was pointed out.

Nearly 150,000 South Koreans live in the United States.

According to the U.S. Department of State, three oral representations were made at the South Korean Embassy in April and May following incidents in which Seoul agents were said to have attempted to harass and intimidate assemblies of South Koreans opposed to the Park administration.

On June 8, the deputy chief of the South Korean Embassy was told again in the State Department that the U.S. Government was concerned about reports of Korean diplomats harassing South Koreans in this country. These objections were repeated late in July by a State Department official to South Korean diplomats.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-16-2012

OGA info handled per letter dated 4/24/12.

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/6/73

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (97-392) (P)

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-16-2012 BY 60322~~

9-24-86
Classified by SP-5 RMP/KSC
Declassify on: OADR

Re Bureau letter to WFO dated 7/19/73.

Enclosed for the Bureau are five (5) copies of a letterhead memorandum reflecting investigation conducted at San Francisco. Enclosed for WFO and Alexandria are two copies each of the letterhead memorandum.

On 7/26/73 a copy of the "San Francisco Chronicle" article mentioned in referenced communication was obtained. A copy of this article is being entered as a page in the attached memorandum.

On 8/17/73, the "San Francisco Chronicle" printed an article by DAVID BINDER, "New York Times" entitled, "South Korea Spies in U.S.". This article dealt specifically with the current situation concerning the harassment of Koreans in the United States by representatives of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). A copy of this article has also been entered as a page to the memorandum. The Bureau is being advised that on 8/15/73 [redacted]

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[redacted] contacted the San Francisco Division regarding an FBI investigation of Korean CIA activities at the request of the State Department. [redacted] was advised that he should direct his inquiry to FBI Headquarters or the State Department.

Also enclosed for the Bureau are two (2) copies of police reports concerning the incident at the International Center, 50 Oak Street, San Francisco. Bureau should note that

- 2 - Bureau (Encs. 7) (RM)
- 2 - WFO (Encs. 2) (RM)
- 2 - Alexandria (Encs. 2) (RM)
- 1 - Los Angeles (Encs. 1) (Info) (RM)
- 1 - New York (Encs. 1) (Info) (RM)
- 1 - St. Louis (Encs. 1) (Info) (RM)
- 2 - San Francisco

MMN/vsk

57 OCT 4 1973

REC-114

105-247904-7

SEP 11 1973

10-23-74 HED/prop

10-2-73 RJI/prop

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



SF 97-392
MMN/vsk

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the reports were received from [redacted]
[redacted] who advised that he obtained the reports from the San Francisco Police Department Crime Prevention Company. [redacted] advised that the Crime Prevention Company appeared to be reluctant in providing the police reports. [redacted] requested that his providing the report remain confidential. [redacted] has forwarded copies of these reports to [redacted]

CALIF.

The police reports reflect that [redacted] wished to file a complaint against [redacted] was advised by the Police Department that he should contact the office of the District Attorney.

The San Francisco Division indices were checked regarding [redacted] was mentioned in [redacted] but the information was not of a derogatory nature. Information in the file reflected [redacted] resided at [redacted] and that he was employed at the [redacted] California.

On 8/24/73 an inquiry was made at the [redacted] [redacted] as to the current employment [redacted] They advised [redacted] could be reached at telephone number [redacted] A call to this number was answered by [redacted] who advised that his business phone number was [redacted] was contacted and interviewed by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] on 8/28/73 at his place of employment, [redacted]

The results are set forth in the attached memorandum. During the course of the interview [redacted] advised that [redacted] wished to have a confidential interview with agents of the FBI. The name of [redacted] was searched through the San Francisco Division indices and [redacted] the information was not of a derogatory nature. [redacted] was contacted and interviewed by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] on [redacted] 73 at his place of residence, [redacted]

The results of the interview have been set forth in the attached memorandum.

CALIF.

The two individuals that have been interviewed appear to be respected people in the [redacted] Community.

SF 97-392
MMN/vsk

[redacted] being a [redacted]
and [redacted] who is [redacted] The inter-
views of both individuals reflect a definite atmosphere of fear
of the current ROK Government by the people of the Korean Com-
munity. Both [redacted] believe that the individual primarily
responsible for the "harassment" of the people in the Korean
Community is [redacted] and his associates.

In view of the information obtained from the interviews
of [redacted] which indicate a ROK CIA operation in the United
States, San Francisco believes that the investigation in this
matter should be continued in view of the possible Foreign Agents
Registration Act violation.

UACB, San Francisco will continue the investigation
in an effort to: (1) determine if ROK CIA agents are in fact
operating in the San Francisco area and utilizing harassment
tactics in behalf of their government and (2) determine if
[redacted] and his associates to include [redacted]
are being directed by the ROK Government.

It should be noted that investigation will ultimately
lead to contacts with the personnel at certain Korean Travel
Agencies and possibly other Korean places of business. The
interviews conducted at San Francisco indicate that a majority
of Korean businesses in foreign countries operate on the approval
of the ROK CIA.

San Francisco at this time is not contemplating an
investigation of [redacted] unless current investiga-
tion produces evidence of a more substantial nature. Should
San Francisco desire to conduct an investigation [redacted] the
Bureau will be advised so that State Department clearance for
such an investigation may be initiated. (U)

The names of [redacted] and [redacted]
[redacted] have been searched through the [redacted] Division
indices with negative results.

The following sources were utilized in the writing
of the attached letterhead memorandum:

SF T-1 is see nonsymbolized source page.
SF T-2 is see nonsymbolized source page.

The attached letterhead memorandum is being classified
Confidential to protect out interest in a foreign diplomatic (U)

SF 97-392
MMN/vsk

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(U) establishment. The LHM is also being classified to protect the identities of both sources in view of the possibility of reprisals that may be taken against them by agencies of the ROK Government. [redacted] specifically requested that his name be kept confidential.

Information copies of this LHM are being sent to the Los Angeles, New York, and St. Louis Divisions in view of their interest in this matter.

LEADS

ALEXANDRIA

(U) AT ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA. [Will contact CIA] and obtain all information that may be of value to this case regarding, [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] should note that interviews have reflected that [redacted]

WFO

AT WASHINGTON, D.C. Will check with [redacted]

(2) Will review indices on [redacted]

If indices contain no information which would preclude an interview of [redacted] it is requested that such an interview be conducted regarding the incident at [redacted] during [redacted] of 1972 and the threatening [redacted]

SAN FRANCISCO

AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA. Will continue investigation to obtain background information of the possible suspects and to determine their activities.

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NONSYMBOLIZED SOURCE PAGE

SF T-1 is

(Protect identity)..

SF T-2 is

(Protect identity).



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

San Francisco, California

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

September 9, 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

All information in this communication is unclassified unless otherwise indicated.

The following are results of investigation conducted at San Francisco, California based on allegations that South Korean intelligence agents stationed in the United States have been engaging in a program of harassment and serious intimidation against Koreans living in this country.

On May 18, 1973, KIM DAE-JUNG, the leader of the South Korean Korean opposition party, gave a speech at the International Center, 50 Oak Street, San Francisco, California. The "San Francisco Chronicle", a San Francisco newspaper, printed an article regarding this incident. A copy of this article entitled, "Korea Exile Leader Sees Fall of Park" is being entered as an appendix to this memorandum.

On August 17, 1973 the "San Francisco Chronicle" printed an article entitled, "South Korea Spies in U.S." by DAVID BINDER, "New York Times". This article dealt specifically with the harassment of Koreans currently residing in the United States. A copy of this article is also being entered as an appendix to this memorandum.

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CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GDS, CATEGORY 2
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4HJ/mre
ON 9.24.86

105-247904-07

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

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On [] 1973 SF T-1, an individual knowledgeable in the activities of the Korean Community in the San Francisco area was contacted by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). SF T-1 made reference to the incident that occurred during the speech of KIM DAE-JUNG at the International Center, 50 Oak Street, San Francisco on May 18, 1973. SF T-1 stated that prior to KIM's speech containers of ketchup and eggs were discovered and exhibited to the audience. This exhibition alerted the audience to a possible incident as it appeared that the ketchup and eggs were to be used to harass the speaker. KIM then began his speech and was interrupted by [] who took a position at the podium and would not relinquish it. Police officers were summoned and upon their arrival a representative of the Korean Consulate in Los Angeles met them and exhibited a card which showed his diplomatic status. This individual who SF T-1 knows as [] then advised the police officers that there was no need for their assistance. The officers left and [] continued to cause a disturbance which caused the police to return and remove him from the premises. SF T-1 advised that [] has a bad reputation in the Korean Community and that he has a number of men that assist him in his activities. During the evening of May 18, 1973, the followers of [] stationed themselves outside the International Center to discourage Koreans from attending the gathering. This resulted in the audience being made-up mainly of older Korean residents of the United States whose ties with the ROK were not as strong. SF T-1 stated that young people were noticeably missing from the audience. SF T-1 further advised [] had brought a photographer with him from Los Angeles and that this individual was observed photographing the audience. (X)(u)

SF T-1 advised that the Korean Consulate in San Francisco has recently instituted a new program which appears to be directed toward gaining a tight control over Korean aliens in the San Francisco Bay area. This new program requires that all Korean aliens in the Bay Area register in person with the Consulate. This makes it necessary for people to leave their jobs to report to the Consulate where they are made to wait before they register. This program also gives the Consulate staff an opportunity to make direct contact with the aliens. As proof of registration, the Consulate issues a card. It was stated by SF T-1 that the Consulate would not provide services for aliens that did not have a card, one

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

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of which would be renewal of passports. This registration program is believed to be limited to the Koreans of the San Francisco area only as it is still in the experimental stage. (S)(u)

SF T-1 further advised that the ROK Government in an effort to protect its image in foreign countries has had people in Korea write letters to relatives in the United States. SF T-1 stated that people have received letters from relatives in Korea requesting that they cease any activity, verbal or otherwise, against the ROK Government. It is his belief that these letters were dictated to the relatives. SF T-1 also advised that people have received threats through the use of the telephone in the form of advice. SF T-1 [redacted]

(S)(u)

SF T-1, when questioned concerning the ROK Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) advised that it is believed among the Koreans that an individual by the name [redacted] is an agent of the ROK CIA. This individual currently [redacted] and refers to himself simply as [redacted]. SF T-1 has heard [redacted] has been observed to certain members of the Korean Community. SF T-1 further stated regarding [redacted] while he [redacted] he is never there. [redacted] recently came to this country from [redacted]

(S)(u)

SF T-1 also feels that [redacted] is being operated by the ROK CIA. SF T-1 advised [redacted] within the past [redacted] years was [redacted] of the ROK Government for his [redacted] in the United States. SF T-1 added [redacted] went [redacted] during the approximate time of KIM DAE-JUNG's abduction in Tokyo, Japan. (S)(u)

SF T-1 advised that the Korean Trade Promotions Company in San Francisco may be an operation of the ROK CIA. This company is located in the Embarcadero Center, San Francisco. SF T-1 advised that an individual by the name [redacted]

[redacted] has since been [redacted]

[redacted] keeps close contact with the ROK Government of President PARK CHUNG HEE.

SF T-1 advised [redacted] went on a trip to [redacted] during the approximate time of KIM's abduction in Tokyo, Japan. (S)(u)

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

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On [] 1973, SF T-2, []

[]
was contacted by Special Agents of the FBI. SF T-2 advised that Koreans are being "harassed" on a world-wide basis by the ROK Government. SF T-2 states that this "harassment" was not wide spread until approximately five years ago. The Korean Community currently lives in an atmosphere of fear of the regime. Even communication with the people of Korea has become difficult in the past year. (S)(u)

[]
[] "Korean Resident Association" and is currently highly infiltrated by people associated with the ROK CIA. (S)(u)

SF T-2 also advised that the Korean Churches in California are being split to eliminate a united Korean group. SF T-2 advised that the number of churches have gone from approximately eight to approximately 120. (S)(u)

SF T-2 advised that the ROK Government is operating a net of informants that work through the Consulate. The information that is received from the informants is forwarded to Korea where the result in many situations would be a letter from a relative in Korea to an individual in the United States. (S)(u)

SF T-2 related an incident which occurred in San Francisco in December of 1972. []

[] In December of 1972, []
[] visited San Francisco. [] who is known to be against the current regime in Korea planned to present a lecture at the Korean Methodist Church, 1123 Powell Street, San Francisco. The lecture was set for 8:00 PM on a certain night and by 12:00 AM that same evening there was still no one in attendance. CALIF.

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

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[redacted]
[redacted] SF T-2 believes
[redacted] On that
same evening, certain individuals stationed themselves in the
vicinity of the church to discourage people from attending
the affair. (u)

SF T-2 advised [redacted] leader of the group in [redacted]
[redacted] that is causing all the trouble is [redacted]
[redacted] is approximately [redacted] years old and is [redacted]

[redacted] very often goes to meet officials of the ROK Government
when they visit [redacted] SF T-2 has observed [redacted] at
the Korean Consulate [redacted] has been in the
past the [redacted] and
in [redacted] he went to Korea and [redacted] for his
[redacted] to the Korean People in the [redacted] area.

SF T-2 advised [redacted] does a lot of traveling and that he
left the country during the approximate time of KIM DAE-JUNG's
abduction in Tokyo, Japan. About ten days prior to this [redacted]
met with [redacted]

[redacted] The meeting took place in [redacted]
[redacted] received free travel tickets for his recent trip from the
[redacted]
has also received free tickets in the past from the [redacted]

SF T-2 stated [redacted] has been an agent of the ROK CIA in the
past and that he first came to the United States in the [redacted]
and returned to Korea in the early [redacted] SF T-1 stated that
he does not know any more as to the whereabouts [redacted] except
that he has been residing in [redacted] for approximately the
[redacted] years. (u)

SF T-2 advised [redacted] has an associate by the name
of [redacted] who is [redacted]
[redacted] is active in the activities of Korean
[redacted] in [redacted] California. [redacted] has received free travel
tickets from the [redacted]

[redacted] SF T-1 added [redacted] was out of town at the
same time [redacted] was absent from [redacted] (u)

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

It is the belief of SF T-2 that [] and his associates are being directed by []
[] It is believed that [] is in charge of either Korean [] in the United States. (S)(u)

In regards to threatening phone calls, SF T-2 stated that the previously mentioned [] has been the recipient of one. The phone call in essence stated [] could be made to disappear without anyone ever noticing it. (S)(u)

SF T-2 advised that [] has been alleged to be [] of the ROK CIA. This individual resides at [] He arrived in the United States [] ago from [] SF T-2 stated []

[] SF T-2 advised that it is common knowledge that Korean businesses cannot operate in Hong Kong without the approval of the ROK CIA. [] [] with the Korean Consul General to meet Premier KIM of the ROK. (S)(u)

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CONFIDENTIAL

Korea Exile Leader Sees Fall of Park

By Tim Findley

Kim Dae-Jung, self-exiled leader of South Korea's opposition party, said yesterday he is confident democracy will be restored to the nation in one or two years even if it takes renewed violence.

The extent of that violence, he indicated, may depend on whether the U.S. allows weapons it supplies to President Park Chung Hee's government to be used, "in the suppression of the will of the people."

Kim, who won 46 per cent of the vote in his New Democratic Party bid to unseat Park in 1971, called the four-term president a "military dictator" who has abandoned constitutional freedoms in South Korea.

IMPOSED

Park's government imposed martial law last October after more than a year of intense political opposition to him and outbreaks of violence.

In December, Park and his government established a new constitution that allows him to stay in power indefinitely and gives him the power to suspend the national parliament at any time.

"The only feasible way to replace Park's government now is for him to resign or for him to die or for there to be a coup d'etat," Kim said through an interpreter.

The 47-year-old Kim, in San Francisco to address a meeting of Korean-American citizens, was a member of the South Korean legislative assembly before the old constitution was suspended. Considered in danger because of his political opposition, Kim fled to Japan and the U.S. after martial law was imposed.

His New Democratic Party, however, has remained as the chief body of political opposition to Park.

RELY

Kim said his party does not rely on the United States to restore democratic freedoms in South Korea. That, he said, "is the burden of the people of Korea themselves."

Kim insisted that the continued presence of the U.S. in Korea is absolutely necessary to maintain a balance of power, but he advocated a four-power agreement among the U.S., China, the Soviet Union and Japan that would assure the independence and security of South Korea and lead ultimately to re-unification with North Korea.

"In dealing with the Communists, we wish to be cautious," Kim said, "but that doesn't necessarily mean we wish to fear the Communists. What we fear is the government of a corrupt dictatorship, but not merely the form of communism itself."

PLAN

His plan for reunification calls for a step-by-step process leading to an eventual "loose federation" that would include equal representation for both Communists and non-Communists.

Negotiations on possible re-unification underway now in Korea, he charged, are a sham being "used by Park as a means of maintaining dictatorial control."

CONFIDENTIAL



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
San Francisco, California

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

September 6, 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Title REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
 INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
 IN THE UNITED STATES

Character

Reference Letterhead memorandum dated
 and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed
in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

SF T-1 and SF T-2 with whom insufficient contact
has been made to determine reliability.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 9 -

CONFIDENTIAL

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Harassment Charges

South Korea Spies
in U.S.By David Binder
New York Times

Washington

South Korean intelligence agents stationed in the U.S. have been increasingly engaging in a program of harassment and serious intimidation against Koreans living in this country.

Most of the reports of harassment come from Korean residents opposed to the government of President Park Chung Hee, but U.S. officials have also expressed concern over the increasingly bold moves by the Korean agency.

In addition, the FBI and local police agencies have reportedly been asked to investigate the operations of Korean agents in this country.

There are close to 150,000 South Koreans living in the United States.

Among the recent incidents reported by Koreans opposed to the present Seoul government are the following:

- In St. Louis, a Korean CIA representative called from Seoul to speak to the master of ceremonies at an assembly of Korean Chris-

tian scholars on April 14 and warned him against anti-Park statements.

- In New York, the Korean consul, In Duk Son, described as a Korean CIA strators on April 29, protest operative, followed demonstrating against the Park military regime and had them photographed.

- In San Francisco, on May 14, the Korean consul from Los Angeles, Young Korean CIA man, appeared Korean CIA man appeared at a rally for the opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, who was abducted in Tokyo last week, accompanied by several toughs carrying bags of eggs and ketchup. Apprehended, one of the toughs, Min Hi Lee, a Karate expert, began abusing Kim and tussled with Kim supporters until removed by a police detachment. Bai protested unsuccessfully.

- In Washington, Bai Hyon Lee, former diplomat, received a letter July 23 from his best friend in Seoul, which in admonishing tones advised him to "stay out" of politics. Lee said it was obviously dictated by the Korean CIA. The next day, in Washington, Young Chee Kang, a journalist, received a letter from his ailing mother in Seoul, accusing him of collaborating with Kim Dae Jung and adding that if he continued,

her life and the lives of his sister and two brothers were in jeopardy. Kang said: "It read as if it was dictated to her."

A week later, also in Washington, Sung Nam Chang, publisher of the Korean-American paper, Free Republic, got a letter from his brother in Seoul warning him of the consequences of continued political opposition.

He and other South Koreans in the country said they were considering renouncing their South Korean citizenship as a means of protecting relatives from reprisals in their homeland.

10-8-
CONFIDENTIAL

SAN FRANCISCO

INTRA-DEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDUM

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POLICE DEPARTMENT

DIST. BUR. DET.
Crime PreventionDAY & DATE
Monday 25 June 73[redacted]
Commanding Officer
Crime Prevention Company

SUBJECT:

Alleged Disturbing the Peace Incident

Sir,

On [redacted] 73 at 2130 hrs RO's [redacted] along with other units were sent to 50 Oak St. on a call from Communications that there was a large fight. Upon arriving, we were met by several security guards who stated that Suspect [redacted] was disrupting a meeting inside. Suspect was described to RO's and with this information, went into the meeting hall to preserve the peace. Upon entering the hall Suspect [redacted] was observed in a rather heated discussion with an apparent speaker, standing at a podium. Suspect [redacted] was asked to leave the hall, which he did willingly. He was taken outside to RO Radio Car where a warrant check was run on him. While waiting for the results RO's were unable to locate anyone who was willing to press charges on Suspect. Approximately five to eight minutes later after determining that the suspect had no outstanding warrants, he was transported to the Hilton Hotel where he said he was spending the night, and released. Suspect was admonished and asked to return to 50 Oak St. Approximately thirty minutes later RO's were contacted by [redacted] of CP-1 who stated that after RO's had left with the suspect, a [redacted] had come forward and had stated he wanted to press charges against Suspect [redacted]. By this time [redacted] had been released and could not be relocated. An incident report [redacted] was made of the incident. And [redacted] advised to contact the DA's office to follow up his complaint.

Respectfully Submitted,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-24-86 BY SP4 [redacted]

105-247904-7

RECEIVED BY
Ernest J. Radbo
Captain of Police
STATION 54N

APPROVED BY: [redacted]

REFER TO

STAN [redacted] 7-7206 STAN

1930hrs Wed 05/07/

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION	DATE	TIME	DAY, DATE, TIME, REPORT
[REDACTED]	C	7	05/18/73 2130hrs
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

0000		
public hall		disturbance
voice	disrupts meetings, disturbs some	

RECEIVED	DATE	TIME	BY	INITIALS
1930hrs Wed 05/30/76				

1--R/O's [redacted] on the 18th of May 73, at 2130 hrs respond a 418 at 50 Oak St. At this location R/O's entered a hall where a political meeting was going on and at this point they observed an individual later identified as [redacted] standing at the front of the hall. R/O's were told by security guards that [redacted] had entered the meeting and had disturbed same. R/O's at this time escorted [redacted] from the premises and asked individuals on the premises if they wished to sign an arrest card. AT this point no one individual came forth to sign an arrest and R/O's transported [redacted] after running a warrant check on him to the Hilton Hotel where [redacted] was released and admonished regarding his actions. Approximately four to seven days later [redacted] responded to Crime Prevention Office and reported that he wished to have [redacted] arrested for disturbing the peace. R/O's on this date responded to [redacted] and interviewed him regarding the incident. [redacted] stated that [redacted] had entered the hall at 50 Oak St. and had threatening other individuals who wished to enter this hall. Then [redacted] was asked to leave the hall as he was not wanted at that location. At this point he interrupted the speaker that was on the platform. After approximately ten minutes of verbal assault upon the speaker that was on the platform, [redacted] was escorted from the premises by R/O's. [redacted] was told to respond to the D.A.'s office to follow this complaint further.

2-SUSPECT [redacted] om approx [redacted] yrs of age. resides
address is [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

3-6 N/A

NAME [REDACTED]		DOB [REDACTED]	
SSN [REDACTED]		05/31/73 0130hrs	
Co. G		ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9-24-86 BY [REDACTED]	

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-130017)(P)

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
Intelligence Activities
in the United States
RA-SO. KOREA

DATE: SEP 14 1973

REC-106

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-24-84 BY SP4/SP12

ReBulet to WFO dated 7/19/73; NYlet to Bu dated 6/21/73, captioned [redacted]

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Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are five (5) copies of an LHM concerning captioned matter. One (1) copy each is also enclosed for Washington Field; Los Angeles, San Francisco and St. Louis.

Information from Washington Post and USDS was first reported in referenced Bureau letter and its enclosures.

Credit Bureau records were checked by SC [redacted] NYCPD records by SA AUGUST J. MICEK; and INS records by SC [redacted] Interview of [redacted] was done by SA [redacted] and was first reported in referenced New York letter. Discreet telephone calls were also made by SA [redacted]

On [redacted] advised SA [redacted] that he had no information concerning captioned matter.

WFO should note that [redacted] presently is probably residing in [redacted] area.

REC-2

105-247904-8

ENCLOSURE

- ② - Bureau (Encls. 5)(RM)
- 1 - Los Angeles (Encl. 1)(RM)
- 1 - San Francisco (Encl. 1)(RM)
- 1 - St. Louis (Encl. 1)(RM)
- 1 - Washington Field (Encl. 1)(RM)
- 1 - New York

SEP 17 1973

RAM:1jk

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

6 OCT 5 1973

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NY 105-130017

It is contemplated [redacted] will again be contacted by the NYO in the near future. The primary discussion will in all probability be [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] his comments and opinions regarding the charges raised in the newspaper accounts accompanying referenced Bureau letter. This course of action will be pursued UACB.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York

SEP 14 1973

Republic of Korea (ROK) Intelligence
Activities In The United States

An article appeared in the "Washington Post" newspaper, published in Washington, D. C., on June 7, 1973, entitled "S. Korea Aide Defects Here," which indicated that several South Korean diplomatic officials stationed in the United States have elected to remain in the United States rather than return to South Korea. It also indicated that South Korean intelligence operatives in the United States engage in surveillance and intimidation of ethnic Koreans residing in this country.

Referral/Consult

Records of the New York Office (NYO) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) contain no information identifiable with [redacted]

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Records of the Credit Bureau of Greater New York, the New York City Police Department, and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, New York City, were caused to be checked and were found to reflect no information identifiable with [redacted]

The [redacted] Division of the [redacted] [redacted] NYC indicates that [redacted] is [redacted] at the [redacted] in NYC. He resides at [redacted] NYC and has telephone number [redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

10/10/86

Sp422/mra

105-247104-8

ENCLOSURE

Republic of Korea (ROK) Intelligence
Activities in the United States

Attached to this memorandum are copies of two articles which appeared in the "New York Times" concerning this matter. In the article entitled "Threat to Koreans in U. S. By Seoul Stirs Concern," reference is made to the Korean Consul, Gin Duk Son, in NYC, who is described as a Korean Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative who reportedly followed Korean protestors in NYC on April 29, 1973, and had them photographed.

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On June 8, 1973, [redacted]

[redacted] was interviewed on another matter and advised that he is [redacted]

[redacted] During the latter part of April, 1973, a group of approximately 70 dissenters against President PAK Chong-hui of the ROK demonstrated in NYC. The leader of this group was KIM Tae-chong, a former candidate for the Presidency of South Korea and a leader of the opposition party to PAK Chong-hui. This demonstration was not Communist or leftist in any way. They simply wanted to protest the new political restrictions imposed by President PAK in South Korea. The demonstration was peaceful, but not successful. [redacted] stated he observed this demonstration but did not hinder it in any way. (X)

(U)

(U) On September 10, 1973, a discreet telephonic inquiry to the South Korean Consulate, NYC, asking for [redacted] ascertained that he has been "transferred" to [redacted] (X)

On September 10, 1973, a discreet telephonic inquiry to telephone number [redacted] asking for [redacted] determined that he no longer is residing at that address, [redacted] which is the address for the [redacted]

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Threat to Koreans in U.S. By Seoul Stirs Concern

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 16— Among the recent incidents South Korean intelligence reported by Koreans opposed agents stationed in the United to the present Seoul Govern- States have been engaging in ment are the following:

an increasing program of harassment and serious intimidation against Koreans living in this country.


Most of the reports of harassment come from Korean residents opposed to the Government of President Park Chung Hee, but United States officials have also expressed concern over the increasingly bold moves by the Korean agency.

According to the State Department, three oral representations were made at the South Korean Embassy in April and May. On June 8 the deputy chief of the South Korean Embassy was told again in the State Department that the United States Government was concerned about reports that Korean diplomats were harassing South Koreans in this country. These objections were repeated late in July by a State Department official to Korean diplomats.

In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local police agencies have reportedly been asked to investigate the operations of Korean agents in his country.

In St. Louis, a Korean C.I.A. representative called from Seoul to speak to the master of ceremonies at an assembly of Korean Christian scholars on April and warned him against

Continued on Page 2, Column 4



Sang Ho Lee, minister in the South Korean Embassy who is responsible for security affairs.

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

and Park statements.

In New York, the Korean consul, Gin Duk Son, described as a Korean-C.I.A. operative, followed demonstrators on April 29 protesting against the Park military regime and had them photographed.

In San Francisco on May 14, the Korean consul from Los Angeles, Young Sik Bai, also described as a Korean C.I.A. man, appeared at a rally for the opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, who was abducted in Tokyo last week, accompanied by several toughs carrying bags of eggs and ketchup. Apprehended, one of the toughs, Min Hi Lee, a karate expert, began abusing Mr. Kim and tussled with Kim supporters until removed by a police detachment. Mr. Bai protested unsuccessfully.

In Washington, Jai Hyon Lee, former diplomat, received a letter from a close friend in Seoul advising him to "stay out" of politics. Mr. Lee said that it was obviously dictated by the Korean C.I.A. A day later in Washington, Young Chee Kang, a journalist, received a letter from his ailing mother in Seoul, accusing him of collaborating with Kim Dae Jung and adding that if he continued to do so her life and the lives of his sister and two brothers would be in jeopardy. Mr. Kang said: "It read as if it was dictated to her." Several days later in Washington, Sung Nam Chang, publisher of a Korean-American paper, Free Republic, got a letter from his brother in Seoul also warning

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

New York Times

Date:

8/16/73

Edition:

Author:

Editor:

Title:

Character:

or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/16/86 BY [signature]

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Seoul's Harassment of Koreans Living in the U.S. Is Stirring Concern

him of the consequences of continued political opposition.

"They are becoming emboldened more and more," Mr. Kang said.

He and other South Koreans in this country said they were considering renouncing their South Korean citizenship as a means of protecting relatives from reprisals in their homeland.

One Korean who has already taken this step is Jai Hyon Lee, 47, formerly chief cultural and information attaché in the South Korean Embassy, who sought political asylum here June 5. He quit in protest against orders to send back two of his former aides who had also decided against returning.

Contending that he has no special political persuasion, Mr. Lee has nevertheless joined the current campaign of Korean dissidents to defend the opposition leader, Mr. Kim. In an interview he said: "Koreans living in the United States, whether citizens or not, feel unfree in the streets day and night because of the C.I.A."—a reference to the Korean agency.

In the Western intelligence community the Korean C.I.A. "rates good points among those who are good east of Suez," as one operative put it. But its official responsibility for external and internal operations distinguishes it from other intelligence agencies, it was pointed out.

The foreign activities of the Korean intelligence agency were spotlighted last week by charges that it was involved in the kidnapping of Mr. Kim

in Tokyo.

Sang Ho Lee, the Korean intelligence chief here, flew to Seoul July 27—12 days before the abduction of Mr. Kim.

He was preceded by two other South Korean embassy members, a Counselor, Hong Tae Choi, and a second secretary, Chung Il Park, who flew to Asia July 9 and 10. This was at the time that Mr. Kim left the United States for Tokyo and a rally of his supporters in Japan. Both Mr. Choi and Mr. Park are described in intelligence circles as South Korean C.I.A. operatives. All three embassy members returned to Washington over the weekend.

Mr. Lee, in a telephone interview, denied any link with

the Tokyo abduction. "There is nothing connected with me and the kidnapping," he said. "I have no knowledge of it. I can say I made a trip on official business but I cannot say where."

There is an invisible, traditional line across which other foreign diplomats and agents have trod in the past, an American official said, mentioning

the activities of Chinese Nationalist diplomats in the American-Chinese community at the time of the Nixon Administration's approaches to Peking in 1971.

There are close to 150,000 South Koreans living in the United States.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

New York Times

Date:

8/16/73

Edition:

Author:

Editor:

Title:

Character:

or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

8/22

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Seoul's Vast Intelligence Agency Stirs Wide Fear

By RICHARD HALLORAN

Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, Aug. 18

Sometimes the Koreans call it "Central College" and sometimes "South Mountain," but whenever they speak its proper name, the Central Intelligence Agency, their voices invariably drop to a whisper.

On the northeast outskirts of Seoul, the headquarters of South Korea's Central Intelligence Agency is in a large modern building surrounded by a well-kept green park that looks like a college campus—hence "Central College"—save for the high wall and the deflectors on the windows to prevent visual or electronic surveillance. Earlier, the headquarters was in a section of the city called Nam-san, or "South Mountain."

The whispered references reflect fear of the Central Intelligence Agency, which has come to recent attention in the United States because of its reported role in kidnapping a Korean opposition leader from Tokyo as well as through official American complaints that South Korean agents have been harassing Koreans living in the United States.

In South Korea, the intelligence agency is generally regarded as President Park Chung Hee's main instrument for political repression. Its agents, often visible, are everywhere. "They watch everything," an informed Korean said of the internal security division of the intelligence agency. "They have men in just about every other Government office and the Government bureaucrats really

must not irk the C.I.A. man there."

Yet, despite its reputation, the Central Intelligence Agency performs duties that any nation would think necessary to protect itself. Like the United States C.I.A., with which it keeps liaison, the South Korean intelligence agency collects and analyzes information from abroad, particularly on this country's arch enemy, North Korea.

Politician Spirited From Japan

Domestically, the intelligence agency has responsibilities for internal security against espionage and sabotage similar to those of the American Federal Bureau of Investigation. In combating subversion, the C.I.A. works alongside the police, the army security command and the Ministry of Justice.

But the agency is also quite clearly a secret police. It strikes at will, without warning or warrant, and is beyond the law and courts.

Nor is its reach confined to Korea itself. The most recent venture, apparently, was the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung, who was President Park's opponent in the 1971 presidential election, from a hotel in Tokyo on the afternoon of Aug. 8. Mr. Kim was spirited to Seoul and is now under what amounts to house arrest.

The Government here has vigorously denied any connection with the kidnapping. Informed South Korean, Japanese and American sources, however, said that the evidence

seen so far all points to the intelligence agency.

Moreover, those sources surmised that the abduction had the approval of President Park and the director of the intelligence agency, Lee Hu Rak. In authoritarian South Korea, only they could have authorized the operation.

The Korean Central Intelligence Agency was founded after Mr. Park, then an army general, came to power in the military coup of 1961. The agency's first director was Kim Jong Pil, one of the young colonels who organized the coup. He is now the Premier.

From the beginning, the intelligence agency was immersed in politics. Mr. Kim used it to form the Democratic Republican party, the political organization that got Mr. Park his first election victory in 1963 and has continued a dominant role in South Korean politics.

Budget Not Made Public

Since then, the agency has expanded steadily. Neither its budget nor size could be determined, although estimates of its manpower ranged from 100,000 to 300,000.

Informed South Koreans said that the agency attracts, among others, two rather distinct types of men. Some are well-educated, intelligent and dedicated, capable of acquiring and analyzing information. At the other extreme are the muscle men who do the rough jobs without question.

The current director, Lee Hu Rak, is among President Park's closest advisers and is widely

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

—New York Times

—p. 3

Date:

8-20-73

Edition:

Author:

Late City

Editor:

Title:

Character:

or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

☐ Being InvestigatedALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/10/86 BY SP4/ELP/RT

considered the power behind the scenes in Mr. Park's regime. Mr. Lee, who is 49 years old, was an army intelligence officer early in his career and was the chief of the presidential staff from 1963 to 1969.

Mr. Lee helped push through the constitutional amendment in 1969 that allowed President Park to run for a third term in 1971. That was the beginning of Mr. Park's assumption of nearly absolute power. After serving as ambassador to Japan for a year, Mr. Lee became head of the C.I.A. in late 1970.

Officials at the intelligence agency refused to discuss its mission or organization. But an outline was pieced together from other sources here.

Deputy Is an Ex-Prosecutor

Immediately below Mr. Lee are the deputy director, Kim Chi Yul, a former prosecutor in the Ministry of Justice, and two assistant directors, one for external and the other for internal affairs.

There are eight operational bureaus and several staff offices. The bureaus are numbered one through nine, there being no fourth bureau because the number four is believed to be most unlucky in Korea.

The first bureau is the general affairs bureau, responsible for recruiting, training, personnel and administrative functions. It also collects information from abroad through newspapers and magazines and passes that to other bureaus for analysis.

The second is the cultural affairs bureau, which is in charge of internal propaganda and anti-Communist indoctrination. It also oversees the press with supervising agents in each newspaper and broadcasting station.

The third bureau is charged with counterintelligence, the vital task of combating North Korean infiltration, espionage and subversion. It has been rounding up alleged North Korean spy rings at the rate of about one a week recently.

The fifth bureau, responsible for internal security, is the one that South Koreans fear so much. It has agents in many government offices, in banks and businesses, in labor unions, in military units, in art and cultural associations. It also has branch offices in each provincial capital and smaller offices in every city.

The fifth bureau, in addition, has agents in the Foreign Ministry's passport office to give final approval to all South Korean applications for travel abroad. Similarly, it has agents in the Ministry of Justice's immigration office at Kimpo International Airport to check the entry of Koreans and foreigners.

C.I.A. agents watching foreigners in hotel lobbies are usually easy to spot. One was stationed near the door of this correspondent's room for most of a five-day stay and reported comings and goings by phone.

The sixth bureau conducts special missions, usually known in the intelligence trade as dirty tricks, such as sabotage and assassination. The sixth bureau reportedly abducted Kim Dae Jung and brought him to Seoul.

The seventh bureau gathers information from abroad, except from North Korea, and refines it into intelligence for use by political leaders. It has men in each South Korean Embassy, with the senior official usually holding the rank of minister.

The eighth bureau carries on psychological warfare, mostly

against North Korea, through radio and loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflet drops and rumor-spreading.

The ninth bureau, considered to be among the best, specializes in North Korean affairs. The ninth bureau also does staff work for the five senior South Korean officials, led by Mr. Lee, who have been engaged in political negotiations with the North Koreans.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR010 CG CODED

217PM URGENT 9/7/73 EOM

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CHICAGO (185-NEW) 1P

TELETYPE

b6
b7C
b7D

Assoc. Dir.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Legal Coun.	
Cong. Serv.	
Corr. & Crm.	
Research	
Press Off.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

PROPOSED DEMONSTRATION AT KOREAN CONSULATE, CHICAGO,

ILLINOIS, 9/8/73, PFO-DEMONSTRATION - SUBVERSIVE

Republic of Korea Activities

ON 9/7/73, A SOURCE, RELIABLE IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT THE AD HOC COMMITTEE FOR DEMOCRACY IN KOREA PLANS TO HOLD A DEMONSTRATION AT NOON, ON 9/8/73. THE GROUP IS PROTESTING ALLEGED BRUTALITY BY THE KOREAN CIA, AGAINST RESIDENTS OF SOUTH KOREA. APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED DEMONSTRATORS ARE EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE.

THE GROUP WILL MEET AT THE CIVIC CENTER PLAZA AND AFTER HEARING SEVERAL SPEECHES WILL MARCH TO THE KOREAN CONSULATE AT 500 NORTH MICHIGAN AVENUE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS. THE DEMONSTRATION IS EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETELY PEACEFUL.

ADMINISTRATIVE

SOURCE IS

SECRET SERVICE AND STATE DEPARTMENT ADVISED. CHICAGO

IS AWARE OF PROVISIONS OF PFO STATUTE.

END

cc to 105-247904

DKS FBI HQ CLR

55 SEP 24 1973

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-16-80 BY SP4 [signature]

ORIGINAL FILED IN

185-0-417

5-10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

b6
b7c

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/24/73

FROM : SAC, WFO (97-2034)(P)

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

FD-217

105-247904-7
ReSFlet to Bureau, 9/6/73.

On 9/20/73, [redacted] Registration Section, U.S. Department of Justice, 9th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. (WDC), advised SA [redacted] that neither the current nor the terminated registrations contained the names of [redacted] as persons registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

On 9/20/73, [redacted] Korean-American Citizens Committee for Protection of KIM DAE JUNG, advised SA [redacted] that [redacted] also resides in the [redacted] Virginia, area. He advised that [redacted] is also a backer of KIM DAE JUNG. *VA*

The files of WFO contain no information identifiable with [redacted]

LEADS

ALEXANDRIA

Will check office indices concerning [redacted] and advise WFO of the results.

REC-55

ST-109

105-247904-11

2-Bureau
2-Alexandria
2-San Francisco
2-WFO

15 SEP 26 1973

LJT:ls1
(8)

57 OCT 3 1973

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-12-86 BY [signature]



WFO 97-2034

b6
b7C

WASHINGTON FIELD

OK | AT ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA: Unless information is received from the [redacted] Office which would preclude such an interview, UACB, WFO, having substantial background information concerning this matter, will interview [redacted] as set forth in referenced San Francisco letter.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-106784-59)

DATE: September 26, 1973

FROM : LEGAT, TOKYO (80-14) P

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH KOREAN NATIONAL POLICE (KNP)

On 9/13/73, Superintendent General LEE Soon-ku, Chief, Foreign Affairs Division, KNP, Seoul, Republic of Korea (ROK), advised that KNP is sending its first liaison representative to the United States within the next month. Designated for this position is Senior Police Superintendent AHN Kyu-hak, who has been a Legat contact since his assignment over a year ago in similar liaison capacity at Shimonoseki, Japan. AHN will be assigned to the Korean Consulate, Los Angeles, and will probably carry the title of Consul.

Chief LEE advised that Los Angeles was chosen as the first KNP liaison post since the Los Angeles area includes one of the largest centers of Korean population in the United States. If they find this assignment productive, it is expected that a KNP representative will be placed in the Korean Embassy, Washington, D.C., and possibly in other cities as well.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA - INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-18-86 BY SP8BJS/mjs

- ⑤ - Bureau
2 - Los Angeles
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit
1 - Tokyo

NOT RECORDED

49 OCT 26 1973

17 OCT 2 1973

56 NOV 5 1973

HLC: lmg

40

OCT-3-1973

b7D

ORIGINAL FILED IN

62-106784-55

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1-human)
DATE 04-05-2012

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 9/27/73

FROM : SAC, LOS ANGELES (97-383)(C)

~~REC-106~~

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Re Bureau letter to WFO dated 7/19/73.

Los Angeles indices contain no information on
[redacted] A review of various Los Angeles files on
ROK activities in Los Angeles has failed to reveal any
recent information on the ROK Central Intelligence Agency.

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b1

Contact with [redacted], Office of
Security, Department of State, Los Angeles, California,
revealed that [redacted] is listed as [redacted] assigned
to the [redacted] He arrived in [redacted]
[redacted] advised his office has received no complaints and is
conducting no investigation concerning ROK CIA activities. (C)

KOREA

Los Angeles does not feel sufficient information
is available to warrant an investigation of [redacted] (C)

b6
b7C

- 2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York (105-130017)(Info)(RM)
1 - San Francisco (97-392)(Info)(RM)
1 - St. Louis (Info)(RM)
1 - WFO (97-2034)(Info)(RM)
1 - Los Angeles

REC-28/05-247904-12

EX-112 14 OCT 1 1973

JEW/jw
(7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/86 BY [redacted]

~~FILE~~

58 OCT 9 1973

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 04-16-2012

Classification per OGA letter dated 4/9/12.

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10/23/73

FROM : SAC, ALEXANDRIA (97-6) (RUC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

b6
b7C

[redacted] caused a search to be made of
the files [redacted] and was advised
on 10/17/73, that the files contained no pertinent, identifiable
information pertaining to [redacted]

(U)

(C)

b1

2 - Bureau
2 - San Francisco (97-392)
1 - Alexandria
ECR:clf
(5)

EX-105

REC-72

105-247904-13

OCT 24 1973

54 NOV 1 1973



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Assoc. Dir. _____
 Asst. Dir.: _____
 Admin. _____
 Comp. Syst. _____
 Ext. Affairs _____
 Files & Com. _____
 Gen. Inv. _____
 Ident. _____
 Inspection _____
 Intell. _____
 Laboratory _____
 Plan. & Eval. _____
 Spec. Inv. _____
 Training _____
 Legal Coun. _____
 Telephone Rm. _____
 Director Sec'y _____

FTB032 11:42PM 10-11-73 DCW

STATE 916

11:00 AM URGENT 10/12/73 RNB

TO DIRECTOR, FBI NR 241-11

FROM LEGAT TOKYO (82-14) 1P

Republic of Korea INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
in U. S.

RELATIONS WITH [REDACTED]

b6
 b7C
 b7D

RE TOKYO LETTER SEPTEMBER 26, LAST, ADVISING OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] TELEPHONED LEGAT OCTOBER 11, INSTANT, TO ADVISE [REDACTED]

BUREAU PLEASE ADVISE LOS ANGELES TO DISREGARD REQUEST IN
 REFERENCED LETTER.

END

MES JB CLR

NOT RECORDED

40 OCT 26 1973

31d
 57 NOV 05 1973

62-106784-1586901-29
 ORIGINAL FILED IN

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

b6
b7C
b7D

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10/25/73

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (97-392) (P)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-18-86 BY SP4Cup/pe

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

Re San Francisco letter and attached LHM to Bureau,
9/6/73.

[redacted] was contacted on [redacted] regarding additional
individuals that may have information which may be of value to this
case. The source advised that [redacted]
[redacted] is possibly a person that should be
contacted regarding this matter. [redacted] is identical to the individual
mentioned in the [redacted]

On 9/18/73 [redacted]

[redacted] was contacted
regarding the possibility of obtaining the [redacted]
[redacted] furnished the file
[redacted] and advised that their files reflected no record for
[redacted]

[redacted] reflected the following
information:

Name ST-112 REC-7.
DOB
Date of entry
Former address

Business address

Permanent address

2 - WFO (97-2034) (RM)

1 - Alexandria (Info) (RM)

2 - San Francisco

MMN/vsk

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

SF 97-392
MMN/vsk

[redacted] stated
that he makes a minimum of [redacted] dollars a year. [redacted]

On 10/5/73, [redacted] furnished [redacted]
concerning [redacted] The file reflected the following
information: [redacted]

Name
~~DOB~~
~~POB~~
Date of entry

The file reflected [redacted]

An information copy of this communication is being
forwarded to the [redacted] Division in view of the investi-
gation currently being conducted there.

LEADS

WFO

AT WFO. Will contact the [redacted]
[redacted] and have them conduct a search for
additional information regarding [redacted] The fact that information
in the subject's file in [redacted]
[redacted] currently resides [redacted] and has made trips
to the Far East. It is believed that [redacted] may be
able to locate a file [redacted] currently lodged in one of their
offices elsewhere in the country. It is also requested that WFO
conduct a similar search concerning [redacted]

SF 97-392
MMN/vsk

b6
b7C

SAN FRANCISCO

[REDACTED] AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA. Will locate and interview effort to obtain additional information regarding the captioned matter and continue investigation to determine as to whether the aforementioned individuals are in fact agents of the South Korean Government.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 11/19/73

FROM : SAC, WFO (97-20034) (C)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 9-18-86 BY SP4 [signature]

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

Re WFO let to the Bureau, 9/24/73 and San Francisco
letter to the Bureau, 10/25/73.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are five copies of
an LHM dated and captioned as above. Information copies are
being forwarded to Alexandria, New York and San Francisco.
It is noted that the leads set forth in referenced San
Francisco letter will be handled under individual caption
and results reported accordingly.

The interview of [redacted]
[redacted] referred to in the enclosed LHM, was conducted by
Special Agent's [redacted] and [redacted]

Concerning [redacted] remarks that he receives har-
assing-type telephone calls. [redacted]
[redacted] critical of the present Korean Government of
President Chung Hee PARK, WFO is not of the opinion that
further investigation is warranted under the 178 classifica-
tion at this time. [redacted] was advised that should he wish to
pursue the matter of possibly attempting to develop informa-
tion concerning the origin of those calls, he should contact
representatives of the telephone company.

The files of WFO contain no information identifiable
with [redacted] referred to in the enclosed LHM.

It is noted that there appears to be much concern
in certain segments of the Korean community throughout the

- EX-111 REC-8 105-247904-15
- ENCLOSURE
- 2- Bureau (ENCLOS)
 - 1- Alexandria (Info) (ENCLOS)
 - 1- San Francisco (97-392) (Info) (ENCLOS)
 - 1- New York (105-130017) (Info) (ENCLOS)
 - 1- WFO

NOV 21 1973

LJT:tsm
(6)

55 DEC 1 1973

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



WFO 97-20034

United States, about Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) harassment of those individuals opposed to the PARK regime; however investigation to date by WFO fails to substantiate either direct or indirect KCIA involvement. Opposition spokesman quite naturally blamed KCIA for any activity directed against them, usually apparently failing to recognize or acknowledge the fact that the pro-PARK Koreans in the United States would be equally concerned over criticism leveled against the PARK Government.

In view of the above and the fact that an investigation to date fails to substantiate allegations that KCIA and/or their operatives are responsible for acts of harassment against certain Korean elements in the United States, it is felt that no further investigation is warranted in this matter at this time and WFO is placing this matter in a closed status.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

b6
b7C

TO :

[Redacted]

DATE: 2/1/74

FROM :

[Redacted]

SUBJECT :

[Redacted]

REPORTER, "WASHINGTON POST"
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON BUREAU INVESTIGATION OF AGENTS FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA *Intelligence Activities in the United States*

- Comp. Syst. ☒
- Ext. Affairs ☒
- Files & Com. ☒
- Gen. Inv. ☒
- Ident. ☒
- Inspection ☒
- Intell. ☒
- Laboratory ☒
- Plan. & Eval. ☒
- Spec. Inv. ☒
- Training ☒
- Legal Coun. ☒
- Telephone Rm. ☒
- Director Sec'y ☒

[Redacted] a reporter for the "Washington Post," phone [Redacted] contacted my office this date and requested information regarding the Bureau's investigation of agents of the Republic of Korea who have been harrassing Korean Nationalists in this country. He requested also to determine who had requested this investigation and also whether the investigation had been completed.

The Intelligence Division advised that at the request of the State Department in the Summer of 1973 the Bureau was asked to investigate allegations that Korean Nationalists in the United States were being harrassed by agents of the Republic of Korea and at the present time this investigation is still continuing. The Intelligence Division also advised that several press articles had appeared in August, 1973, regarding these allegations and that the State Department had requested an FBI investigation on these allegations.

[Redacted] was advised that at the request of the State Department the Bureau was looking into these allegations and that the investigation was continuing and because of this no information could be furnished to him at this time.

RECOMMENDATION

For information.

- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Press Services Office

TJH:asg
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-10-86 BY [Redacted]

105-247904-

NOT RECORDED

182 FEB 12 1974

3 FEB 6 1974

55 FEB 14 1974

ORIGINAL FILED IN 94-8-6-683

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: DEC 18 1973

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (105-130017) (RUC)
SUBJECT: Republic of Korea
ROK INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE US
IS-SOUTH KOREA

Re New York letter to Bureau, dated 9/14/73.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are five (5) copies of an LHM concerning captioned matter. Information copies of the LHM are being enclosed for St. Louis, WFO and San Francisco.

[redacted] contacted by SAS [redacted]
[redacted] and [redacted]

WFO should note [redacted] is now residing in [redacted] area.

No further investigation into this matter is deemed warranted at the NYO. Accordingly, this case is being placed in an RUC status.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-18-86 BY [signature]

ST 107

REC-59

105-247904-16

15 DEC 20 1973

- 2 - Bureau (Encls. 5) ENCLOSURE
1 - San Francisco (97-392) (Encls. 1) (RM) (INFO)
1 - St. Louis (Encls. 1) (RM) (INFO)
1 - Washington Field (97-20034) (Encls. 1) (RM) (INFO)
1 - New York

RAM:kbm
(6)

1a end state, CIA (cover)
2 AAG-Union Div (info)
1-9-74 RJI/rep

1cc end to DHA
(Liaison) 10-23-74
HED/rep



55 JAN 11 1974 U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York

DEC 18 1973

Republic of Korea (ROK)
Intelligence Activities in
the United States

b6
b7C
b7D

On [redacted] NY T-1, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the articles that appeared in the "New York Times", "Washington Post" and other newspapers in the United States over the past several months that concerned alleged ROK Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) intimidation and harassment of ethnic Koreans residing in the United States were on the whole greatly distorted and elaborated. In one such article, [redacted]

[redacted] was alleged to have surveilled anti-ROK demonstrators during a demonstration in NYC in April, 1973. In point of fact, according to NY T-1, [redacted] asked the demonstrators if he could attend and, in fact, was invited by them to sit on the dais during the various speeches at the demonstration. NY T-1 does not consider this action to be any form of intimidation or harassment. In regard to the three South Korean diplomats, who according to newspaper accounts, "defected" to the United States, NY T-1, [redacted] understands that it was mostly for personal reasons that they decided to remain in the United States. [redacted] who was [redacted]

[redacted] was disgruntled because [redacted]

He also had [redacted]

[redacted] The other two individuals were disgruntled due to [redacted]

[redacted] NY T-1 does not feel that any of these individuals were, in fact, intimidated by the ROK CIA. [redacted] presently is residing [redacted] and is [redacted]

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

-1*-

ENCLOSURE

105-247904-16

9-18-86

Spencer

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

b6
b7C
b7D

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 12/13/73

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-119291) (RUC)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-18-86 BY [REDACTED]

105-247904-14
ReSFlet to the Bureau, 10/25/73, captioned "REPUBLIC
OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES; Regis-
tration Act - South Korea".

On 12/4/73, representatives of the Office of Security and
the Visa Office, United States Department of State, Washington,
D. C. (WDC), advised SA [REDACTED] that files of those
respective offices contained no information identifiable with
captioned subject.

On [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
advised SC [REDACTED] that in addition to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

For the information of the Los Angeles Office, captioned
subject is of investigative interest to the [REDACTED]
Office under caption of referenced communication.

The files of WFO contain no additional information iden-
tifiable with captioned subject.

LEAD

LOS ANGELES DIVISION

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA. Will [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] review [REDACTED] pertaining to [REDACTED]
and furnish results to [REDACTED]

cc'd
2-Bureau
2-Los Angeles (RM)
2-San Francisco (97-392) (RM)
1-WFO
LJT:ags
(7)

JAN 8 1974

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



INCONS DEC 28 1973

Attcons

JAN 8 1974

SAP

b6
b7C

U.D.I

Byfile 105-255520 cont. into
" 105-247904 per 1/4/74

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 12/13/73

FROM : SAQ, WFO (105-120595) (RUC)

b6
b7C

SUBJECT

CALIF.

ReSFlet to the Bureau, dated 10/25/73, and captioned
"Republic of Korea Intelligence Activities in the United
States; Registration Act - South Korea".

On 11/29/73, representatives of the Office of Security
and Visa Office, United States Department of State, Washington,
D. C. (WDC), advised SA [] that files of those
respective offices contained no information identifiable with
captioned subject.

On 12/6/73, a representative of the Central Office,
USINS, WDC, advised SC [] that based on
available information no record pertaining to captioned sub-
ject could be located in the files of that Office.

The files of WFO contain no information identifiable
with captioned subject.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-19-86 BY SP4 RUP/RS

REC-15

MCT-15

105-247904-17

15 DEC 13 1973

2-Bureau
2-San Francisco (97-392) (RM)
1-WFO
LJT:ags
(5)

JAN 8 1974



DEC 17 2 42 PM '73
RECEIVED
INTELLIGENCE DIV.

RECEIVED

17

DEC 17 1973

b6
b7C

By file 105-255519 020
into Bufile 105-24794
per [redacted] DTD

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 1/22/74

FROM : *me/ym*
SAC, WFO (97-2034)

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
RA
(00:WFO)

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1-human)
DATE 04-05-2012

b1

(C) On 1/15/74, [redacted] who has provided reliable
information in the past, has furnished the following information: (C)

(C)

(C)

[Large redacted box]

b1

This information is provided for the benefit of
New York.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Classified by *SP4 JTW/ate*
Declassify on: OADR

EX-109

(C) 2- Bureau
2- New York
2- WFO

REC-1

105-247904-19

4 JAN 23 1974

b1

DWM:jim

54 FEB 6 1974

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1-human)
DATE 04-05-2012

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~Classified top secret~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~
~~26053~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-254318)

DATE: 12/14/73

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-120587) (C)

SUBJECT: SOUTH KOREA CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
REQUESTS FOR ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
IS-SOUTH KOREA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE

ReBulet to Alexandria, dated 10/18/73
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are five copies of
an LHM dated and captioned as above. One copy is being fur-
nished to the Alexandria Office for their information.

(U) The enclosed LHM is classified "Confidential, No
Foreign Dissemination" inasmuch as it discloses FBI investi-
gative interest in a foreign diplomatic establishment.

(C) WF T-1 is [redacted]

b1

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b7C

(U) The files of WFO contain no information identifiable
with [redacted]

In view of the above fact that no information has
been developed which would indicate that persons referred to
in the enclosed LHM are acting in any manner inimical to the
best interest of the United States, it is not felt that
further investigation is warranted at this time either in
this matter or under individual investigations concerning
persons referred to in the LHM.

WFO is taking no further action concerning this
matter and this case is being placed in a closed status.

NOT RECORDED

41 JAN 10 1974

- 2- Bureau (Enc 5)
2- Alexandria (105-2183) (Enc 1)
2- WFO

b1

LJT:tsm
(6)

10-1-19 (Comm) re Ser 4/1
5-1-19 (12-1-19) re Ser 4/1
1-1-19 (12-1-19) re Ser 4/1
C.C. of [redacted]
to 105-247904

50 JAN 14 1974

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Original Filed In 105-254318-5



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C. 20535
December 14, 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

SOUTH KOREA CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
REQUESTS FOR ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
INTERNAL SECURITY-SOUTH KOREA

b1



(C)

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 04-05-2012

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

Classified by Gerald E. Nolan
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Declassification on Indefinite

9-17-86 Multiple copies
Classified by ~~SP-10~~
Declassify on: OADR
246053

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

S-1 State

FOI TA 246053
E.O. 12356
DATE 9-18-86 INITIALS <i>Dupre</i>

ENCLOSURE

SOUTH KOREA CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(C)



This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI and is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

b6
b7C
b7D

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 1/21/74

FROM : ~~LOS ANGELES~~ LOS ANGELES (105-36396) (RUC)

SUBJECT:

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

185-247904-18
Re Washington Field letter to the Bureau dated
12/13/73.

On 1/10/74, a review of

revealed

the following information:

Name
Date of Birth
Place of Birth
Height
Hair
Eyes
Marital Status

105-247904-21

entered the United States at

- 2 - Bureau (RM)
- 2 - San Francisco (97-392) (RM)
- 1 - Los Angeles

JEW/cdr
(5)

FEB 15 1974

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-12-86 BY [signature]

cah
(over)

1 - Mr. F. S. Putman

b6
b7C

SAC, [REDACTED] (97-392)

3/6/74

REC-82

Director, FBI (105-247904) - 221 - [REDACTED]

**REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA**

Reurlet 2/7/74.

Your request to interview [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] is approved. You are to be especially alert during these interviews [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Furnish results of interviews under separate individual captions in form suitable for dissemination with copy designated for captioned Bureau control file. Disseminate results of interviews locally to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

Your request to interview [REDACTED] is being held in abeyance pending receipt of additional background information. Review of Bureau file fails to reflect complete identity of this individual. You are to submit additional background on [REDACTED] including his current residence and occupation.

RJI:jlb
(5)

NOTE:

Captioned case was initiated at State Department request following allegations in the press that ROK Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents were harassing ROK residents in the U.S. [REDACTED] by referenced letter requested Bureau authority to interview [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] With exception of additional background information on [REDACTED] all logical investigation has been conducted except interviews of these [REDACTED] individuals. [REDACTED]

MAILED 7

MAR 5 1974

FBI

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

55 MAR

1974

HLD

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

DATE: 2/7/74

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (97-392)

SUBJECT: *cu3/yr*
REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA
OO: San Francisco

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-24-96 BY SP4 RUP/ace~~

Re San Francisco letter and LHM dated 9/6/73.
San Francisco letter to the Bureau dated
10/25/73.
Los Angeles letter to the Bureau dated 1/21/74.

Enclosed for the Bureau are five (5) copies of a
letterhead memorandum which reflects investigation conducted
at San Francisco regarding the captioned matter.

San Francisco has had continued contact with
[redacted] PSI, individuals knowledgeable in
the activities of the Korean community of San Francisco.
On [redacted] 7/74 [redacted] PSI was contacted and interviewed in an
effort to obtain information regarding specific incidents of
"harassment tactics" that were instigated by the Government
of the Republic of Korea (ROK). The source was unable to
provide information of this nature. He advised that his
knowledge of the situation stems from what he has heard from
other people and information that is considered "common
knowledge" among the people of the Korean community. On the
same date, [redacted] PSI was also recontacted and interviewed
in an effort to obtain the same information. The source was
unable to provide any substantial information. The source
did, however, advise [redacted] is currently [redacted]

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gm

The source speculated that
[redacted] may in whole or part originate from the

REC-82

105-247904 22

FEB 11 1974

- ② - Bureau (Encls. 5) (RM)
- 2 - San Francisco
- MMN/pkv (S-7)
- (4)

ENCLOSURE

1cc encl State, (IA (courier))

2cc encl AAG-Crim Div. (info) 2-15-74

RJI/rep

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

DOC. CLASS.



let SF, 3/6/74; RJI:jlh

SF 97-392

MMN/pkv

b6
b7C
b7D

ROK Government. Both sources advised that things have been quiet subsequent to the incident at the International Center, 50 Oak Street, San Francisco.

On 11/12/73, an attempt was made to contact [redacted] with negative results. On 12/19/73 [redacted] was contacted at the above address and interviewed. He advised that he is [redacted]

[redacted] advised that he was present at the gathering at 50 Oak Street when a disturbance was caused [redacted] provided essentially the same information as obtained from prior interviews with [redacted] On 1/29/74 [redacted] was recontacted to determine if he could provide information regarding specific incidents where the ROK Government, through its agents, employed harassment tactics to the Korean residents of this country [redacted] was unable to provide information of this nature.

On 12/19/73, [redacted] was contacted in view of allegations which stated that [redacted]

[redacted] spoke in favor of the ROK Government and advised that he is a close friend of [redacted] He advised that [redacted]

[redacted] advised that should the FBI care to contact [redacted] it could be done through the Korean Consulate, as they would have his address.

On 1/29/74 [redacted] was contacted as a result of allegations which state that this [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] has never done business with [redacted]

On 1/29/74 [redacted] was contacted regarding the allegations that [redacted]

SF 97-392
MMN/pkv

[redacted]
advised that he has never done business with [redacted]
[redacted] advised that they are familiar
with [redacted]
[redacted]

Identifying data for [redacted] as reflected
in San Francisco letter dated 10/25/73, and [redacted] as
reflected in the referenced Los Angeles letter are being
entered as part of the enclosed LHM.

The following sources were utilized in the writing
of the enclosed LHM:

SOURCE

IDENTITY

SF T-1

SF T-2

SF T-3

[redacted]
See nonsymbol source
page

REQUEST OF BUREAU

San Francisco is requesting authority from the
Bureau to interview [redacted]

[redacted] The interviews will be aimed at determining
their exact relationship, if any, with the ROK Government.


The enclosed letterhead memorandum is being
classified "CONFIDENTIAL" to protect our interest in a
foreign diplomatic establishment. The LHM is also being
classified to protect the identities of the sources in view
of the possibility of reprisals that may be taken against
them by agencies or sympathizers of the ROK Government. (U)

LEADS

SAN FRANCISCO

AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA. Will continue


SF 97-392
MMN/pkv




b6
b7C

investigation to obtain additional information regarding the captioned matter.

2) Should authority be obtained, will interview



SF 97-392
MMN/pkv




NONSYMBOL SOURCE PAGE

SOURCE

IDENTITY

SF T-3

b6
b7C
b7D





UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Francisco, California

February 7, 1974

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

All information in this communication is unclassified unless otherwise indicated.

The following are the results of investigation conducted at San Francisco, California based on allegations that the Republic of Korea (ROK) intelligence agents stationed in the United States have been engaging in a program of harassment and serious intimidation against persons of Korean ancestry residing in this country.

SF T-1, a source familiar with the activities of the San Francisco Korean community, was contacted on January 29, 1974 and interviewed regarding possible ROK Government activities within the Korean community. The source advised that he does not know of any harassment type activity in the Korean community which is initiated by the ROK Government. The source was also unable to provide any specific instances of "harassment" where he has first hand

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
CLASSIFIED BY
5478
EXEMPT FROM GDS,
CATEGORY 2
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION:
INDEFINITE

DECLASSIFIED BY *Sp4 Ew/mr*.....
ON *9.24.86*.....

Sources whose identities are concealed herein have furnished reliable information in the past except where otherwise noted.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency

105-247904-22
ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

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b7D

knowledge. SF T-1 advised that this is true with the exception of the incident at the International Center, 50 Oak Street, San Francisco on May 18, 1973, at which time a speech by KIM Dae-jung was disrupted. (S) W

SF T-2, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was contacted and interviewed on January 29, 1974 by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). SF T-2 was unable to provide information concerning specific instances of harassment by the ROK Government, subsequent to the incident at the International Center, 50 Oak Street, San Francisco. The source stated [REDACTED] who he alleges was the cause of the aforementioned disturbance, is currently a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The source stated [REDACTED] appears to be investing a substantial amount of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The source speculated that the ROK Government may be the source [REDACTED] (S) W

SF T-3, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was contacted on December 19, 1973 and January 29, 1974 in an effort to obtain information concerning specific instances of harassment or intimidation carried on in behalf of the ROK Government. SF T-3 advised that he was present at the International Center, 50 Oak Street on May 18, 1973 when a speech by KIM Dae-jung was disrupted [REDACTED]

SF T-3 advised [REDACTED] took a position at the podium and refused to relinquish it to KIM, the principal speaker. The police were summoned, [REDACTED] was removed from the premises. SF T-3 advised that followers [REDACTED] were stationed outside the building to discourage people from entering. SF T-3 advised that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was present and that [REDACTED] a photographer [REDACTED] was filming the people in the audience. SF T-3 stated that [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

b6
b7C

With the exception of the above incident, SF T-3 could not furnish any information concerning additional incidents of harassment which could possibly be connected to the ROK Government. (g)u

[redacted] was contacted and interviewed on December 19, 1973 in an effort to determine if [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] and spoke very highly [redacted] stated that he is familiar with the incident which occurred at the International Center and advised that it was in no way instigated by the ROK Government [redacted] advised [redacted] acted strictly as a result of his personal feelings. It is [redacted] belief that what has been called "harassment tactics" of the ROK Government are really the acts of individuals sympathetic to, but in no way connected to, the ROK Government.

[redacted] was contacted on January 29, 1974 in an effort to determine if [redacted]

[redacted] advised [redacted] has never conducted business at [redacted]

[redacted] was contacted on January 29, 1974 in an effort to determine if [redacted]

[redacted] advised [redacted] has never done business with [redacted]

The following is descriptive data for [redacted]

[redacted] This information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

b6
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b7D

was extracted from [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Name:
Date of Birth:
Date of Entry:
Former Address:

Business Address:

Permanent Address:

Spouse:
Children:

The following is a description of [REDACTED] as
reflected in [REDACTED]

Name:
Date of Birth:
Place of Birth:
Height:
Hair:
Eyes:
Spouse:
Child:
Brother:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dissemination &
Routing Slip
FD-417 (9-12-69)

(Copies to Offices Checked)

To: ☒ Director, Att.: INTD
☒ SAC.

gag

<input type="checkbox"/> Albany	<input type="checkbox"/> Houston	<input type="checkbox"/> Oklahoma City
<input type="checkbox"/> Albuquerque	<input type="checkbox"/> Indianapolis	<input type="checkbox"/> Omaha
<input type="checkbox"/> Alexandria	<input type="checkbox"/> Jackson	<input type="checkbox"/> Philadelphia
<input type="checkbox"/> Anchorage	<input type="checkbox"/> Jacksonville	<input type="checkbox"/> Phoenix
<input type="checkbox"/> Atlanta	<input type="checkbox"/> Kansas City	<input type="checkbox"/> Pittsburgh
<input type="checkbox"/> Baltimore	<input type="checkbox"/> Knoxville	<input type="checkbox"/> Portland
<input type="checkbox"/> Birmingham	<input type="checkbox"/> Las Vegas	<input type="checkbox"/> Richmond
<input type="checkbox"/> Boston	<input type="checkbox"/> Little Rock	<input type="checkbox"/> Sacramento
<input type="checkbox"/> Buffalo	<input type="checkbox"/> Los Angeles	<input type="checkbox"/> St. Louis
<input type="checkbox"/> Butte	<input type="checkbox"/> Louisville	<input type="checkbox"/> Salt Lake City
<input type="checkbox"/> Charlotte	<input type="checkbox"/> Memphis	<input type="checkbox"/> San Antonio
<input type="checkbox"/> Chicago	<input type="checkbox"/> Miami	<input type="checkbox"/> San Diego
<input type="checkbox"/> Cincinnati	<input type="checkbox"/> Milwaukee	<input type="checkbox"/> San Francisco
<input type="checkbox"/> Cleveland	<input type="checkbox"/> Minneapolis	<input type="checkbox"/> San Juan
<input type="checkbox"/> Columbia	<input type="checkbox"/> Mobile	<input type="checkbox"/> Savannah
<input type="checkbox"/> Dallas	<input type="checkbox"/> Newark	<input type="checkbox"/> Seattle
<input type="checkbox"/> Denver	<input type="checkbox"/> New Haven	<input type="checkbox"/> Springfield
<input type="checkbox"/> Detroit	<input type="checkbox"/> New Orleans	<input type="checkbox"/> Tampa
<input type="checkbox"/> El Paso	<input type="checkbox"/> New York City	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Washington Field
<input type="checkbox"/> Honolulu	<input type="checkbox"/> Norfolk	

Date 4/17/74

RE: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S.
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA
OO: WFO

REMARKS:

105-247904
Re Bulet to New York, dated 4/10/74,
with triple caption including above.

Enclosed for information of WFO are
following pertinent communications NOT RECORDED
previously furnished WFO per instructions in APP 22 1974
relet:

SF letter and LHM, dated 9/6/73.
SF letter and LHM, dated 2/7/74.

SAC CHARLES W. BATES

BU 105-247904 (RM)
FILE #: WFO 97-2034 (Encl. 4) OFFICE SAN FR
(RM)
SF 97-392

22
54 APR 24 1974

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-17-86 BY SP4 Bep/rd

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 04-05-2012

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

DATE: 5/28/74

Classification per OGA letter dated 4/9/12.

FROM : SAC, WFO (97-2034) (P)

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

(OO: WFO)

ReBuairtel 5/7/74. NR

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are five copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above.

The enclosed LHM is classified "Secret" because information obtained from WF T-2 was so classified. It would otherwise be classified "Confidential" because it shows FBI investigative interest in foreign diplomatic personnel.

WF T-1 is

b1

WF T-2 is identified on the Non-symbol Source Page attached.

In view of the information contained in enclosed LHM which indicates that the KCIA is apparently not at this time engaged in any activities which would warrant additional investigation under individual case captions, WFO will continue to follow KCIA activities through above-captioned case. If any information is developed which would warrant further investigation, appropriate recommendations will be made to the Bureau.

WFO will continue to follow instant matter and where appropriate make further recommendations.

- 2 - Bureau (Enc. 5)
1 - New York (Enc. 1) (Info)
1 - WFO
LJT/sgl
(4)

ENCLOSURE
REC 27
EX-105
CLASSIFIED BY 7366
EXEMPT FROM GDS, CATEGORY 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

15 MAY 29 1974

NON-SYMBOL SOURCE PAGE ATTACHED

1 - Bureau (Enc. 5) (Info)
2 - AAG On Dir

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WFO 97-2034

b1

ADMINISTRATIVE - NON-SYMBOL SOURCES PAGE
WFOlet dated 5/28/74.

(S)

THIS PAGE IS TO BE RETAINED IN HEADQUARTERS CITY AT ALL TIMES.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
Memorandum

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)
DATE 04-05-2012

Dep. AD Adm. ☒
Dep. AD Inv. ☒
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ☐
Comp. Syst. ☐
Ext. Affairs ☐
Files & Com. ☐
Gen. Inv. ☐
Ident. ☐
Inspection ☒
Intell. ☒
Laboratory ☐
Plan. & Eval. ☐
Spec. Inv. ☐
Training ☐
Legal Coun. ☐
Telephone Rm. ☒
Director Sec'y ☒

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

Classification per OGA letter dated 4/9/12.

FROM : LEGAT, TOKYO

DATE: May 2

5/24/74

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6
b7C
b7D

RUC

INVESTIGATIONS IN
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
(BUfile 62-106784-59)
(TOKfile 80-14)

SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

Republic Of Korea Intelligence Activities In The U.S.

Re: Bureau letter to Tokyo, 2/15/74, advising of meet-
ing with Attorney General WILLIAM SAXBE and visit to the Bureau
on 2/15/74 of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bureau letter noted that [REDACTED] was
keenly interested in overall operations of the FBI, and
particularly in continued training of Korean police officers
in the FBINA. Bureau instructed Legat to contact [REDACTED] during
next roadtrip to ROK.

Legat met [REDACTED] on 5/21/74 at Seoul, Korea, and, in view
of [REDACTED] expressed interest in FBINA. Legat asked [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to be present. [REDACTED] at time of the meeting had with
him [REDACTED] who apparently is identical with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] who accompanied [REDACTED]

Prior to the meeting, Legat had ascertained through [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ROK Prime Minister
KIM Chong-pil, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] KIM Chong-pil was Director
of ROK CIA during early years of the present PAK Chong-hui
regime and is reputed to be the man who engineered the coup
which put PAK in power. (Legat met KIM Chong-pil when he was
ROK CIA Director.)

⑤ - Bureau

2 - Washington Field

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit

2 - Tokyo (1 - 105-5755; 1 - 80-14)

HLC:lmg

Copy made for Tokyo

MAY 29 1974

NOT RECORDED

FIVE

TWO

JUN 24 1974

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-223936-10

~~SECRET~~

TOK 105-5755
80-14

(U)

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Legat furnished [] copies of current FBI publications descriptive of the FBINA, FBI and police cooperation, [] asserted his sincere interest in enlarging the level of cooperation and liaison between Korean security agencies and FBI. This led to suggestion by him that contact between FBI and ROK CIA would be mutually beneficial and, specifically, that Legat meet during next visit to Seoul, and discuss mutual interests with Deputy Director YANG Tu-wun of ROK CIA. He pointed out that at present ROK CIA, more than KNP, controls espionage and security investigations in ROK, and that undoubtedly cases of direct interest to FBI could be brought to our attention through this channel. (S)

(U)

At this point, [] actively entered the conversation and strong impressions gained from his remarks in context of his obvious close relationship and coordination with [] were that (1) [] has a close connection with ROK CIA, whether officially as an agent or employee, or unofficially; (2) [] is probably sponsored by the ROK Government and is used as [] base for ROK interests under leadership [] and (3) [] is "wired" with highest levels of the ROK Government. [] made a point of emphasizing his close association with several Attorneys General and his close relationship with numerous members of Congress and other U.S. Government officials. (It will be recalled [] for Vice President FORD right after his appointment to that position. [] emphasized his respect for the FBI, mentioning that his acquaintances include several members of Congress who are former FBI Agents. He said he expects to meet Director KELLEY and Mr. CALLAHAN in the near future, at which time he hopes to reaffirm the suggestion made by [] that Legat re-establish productive liaison with ROK CIA. (S)

(U)

There is no known reason why Legat should not meet with ROK CIA officials during next visit, and circumspectly discuss mutual interests. []

b1

(U)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TOK 105-5755
80-14

(U)

(S)

b1



An interesting point is that according to American Embassy, Seoul, [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] to Ambassador PHILIP C. HABIB, who becomes livid if he learns that any Embassy personnel so much as talk with him. He has characterized [redacted] referring to his efforts (reportedly somewhat successful) to obligate certain U.S. Congressmen, and is felt to be an ROK CIA agent who is a key figure in channelling operational funds to ROK CIA representatives in the United States. It was noted [redacted] commented to Legat, though in very low-key terms, that he had found members of the U. S. Embassy rather narrow-minded and inflexible in his efforts to work with them. Thus, it appears that there may be two sides to the story, but that Ambassador HABIB's characterization of [redacted] is not entirely wrong. (S)

(U)

²³³ Bureau is referred to Washington Field letters 4/10/72 and 5/24/72 (WFO file 105-107495) which include background and some derogative information concerning [redacted]

[redacted] It is to be noted [redacted] is [redacted] years of age, [redacted] intelligent, very articulate, tactful but self-confident almost to point of cockiness. [redacted]

[redacted] He represented to Legat that he often finds it hard to decide whether his basic loyalties are with ROK or the United States. One may judge, however, that they are primarily with [redacted]

(U)

(S)

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2333 gah/pol
REASON FOR EXTENSION 23
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 5/24/74

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TOK 105-5755
80-14

(U)

~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Legat meet Deputy Director YANG Tu-wun or other appropriate officials of ROK CIA during next roadtrip, discuss mutual interests, and make recommendation to Bureau thereafter as to future liaison:

(U)

~~(S)~~

b6
b7C

(2) That the Director not be available for meeting with [redacted] if he should ask for an appointment, but [redacted] be received by another official for evaluation of any comments or suggestions he may have.

(U)

~~(S)~~

OK

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904) DATE: 5/31/74

FROM : *Cubert*
SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (97-392) (P)

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

b6
b7c

Re Bureau letter to San Francisco, 3/6/74.

7 Referenced letter authorized interviews of [redacted] Delay in handling the latter has been due to the reassignment of this case to Agents who were subsequently assigned to the [redacted] in this office.

The case Agent to whom this case is presently assigned has fully reviewed this matter and is attempting to contact [redacted] for interview, in order that this matter may be brought to an early conclusion. Careful attention will be given to the [redacted] as noted by referenced Bureau letter, and results will be furnished per Bureau instructions in referenced letter.

21

② - Bureau (RM)
① - San Francisco
HLM/crv
(3)

EX-105 REC 99

105-247904-29

21 JUN 7 1974

HLD
BIVEM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-22-96 BY 4848upre



55 JUN 12 1974

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 04-05-2012

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

DATE: JUN 18 1974

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-130017) (P)

SUBJECT: ROK INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE US
RA-SOUTH KOREA

FOI/PA # 200 053

APPEAL #

CIVILIAN

E.O. 12356

DATE 9-24-86 INITIALS [signature]

~~Classified by Sp4 [signature]~~
~~Declassify on [signature]~~

ReBuairtels to NY and WFO, dated 4/25/74, 5/7/74, 5/10/74 and 5/24/74; WFOlet to Bu, dated 5/28/74; Buairtels to Baltimore, Washington Field and New York, dated 4/18/74 and 5/24/74, captioned "WASHINGTON AREA KOREAN STUDENTS ASSOCIATION"; NYlet to Bu, dated 6/17/74, captioned "WASHINGTON AREA KOREAN STUDENTS ASSOCIATION".

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are five copies of an LHM, regarding captioned matter. One copy is also enclosed for WFO.

Demonstration in LHM was observed by SA DAVID D. O'CONNOR.

ReBuairtel of 4/25/74, requested New York to further identify [redacted]

NYO indices and the records of INS at NYC, NYCPD, and the New York Telephone Company were caused to be checked during May, 1974, without obtaining positive information regarding the above individuals. A similar check at the Greater New York City Credit Bureau reflected no information concerning [redacted]

However, [redacted] was shown to be [redacted]

- (2) - Bureau (Encls 5) **ENCLOSURE**
1 - Washington Field (Encls 1) **REC-105**
1 - New York (105-)
1 - New York (105-)
1 - New York (105-)
1 - New York (105-)
1 - New York (105-)
1 - New York (105-)
1 - New York

15 JUN 20 1974

RAM:rcd

(9)

100 encl CIA [signature] AAG- [signature] Du 6-20-74

JUL 26 1974

~~SECRET~~

U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



5010-110

FIVE

Unrecorded Copy Filed in

Ce 105- each of seven orig. info
labeled page 2

105-266264
105-266265
105-266266
105-266267
105-266268
105-266269
105-266270

b6
b7C
b7D

NY 105-130017

Separate 105 cases are being opened at the NYO concerning [redacted] in an effort to further identify them. (1) (2)

Re Bureau airtels also requested the NYO to give consideration to the source potential of several other ethnic Koreans in the New York City area. To this end cases are being opened on the following individuals:

[redacted]

NYO indices reflect no information identifiable with the above individuals. (S) u

It is noted that re New York letter dated 6/17/74. (S) advised that cases are being opened at the NYO on [redacted] (above) [redacted] Pending [redacted] (1) pertains to [redacted] (S) u

[redacted]
he will be contacted concerning this matter and concerning the identities of possible ROK CIA officials in the NYC area.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York

JUN 18 1974

Republic Of Korea Intelligence Activities In The
United States

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-05-2012 BY 60322~~

On April 27, 1974, an anti-North Korean demonstration was observed to occur at 2:00 p.m. at 47th Street and Second Avenue, New York City, near the United Nations. Approximately 50-60 ethnic Koreans, including ten children participated. Leaflets indicated that the demonstration was in behalf of South Korean fishermen who were recently captured by North Korea. Placards in English called for the release of the fishermen and for the unification of Korea. The rally lasted about an hour. Speeches were given, all in Korean. The demonstration was peaceful in all respects.

Some of the demonstrators left in the following automobiles. Owners listed were later ascertained through New York State Department of Motor Vehicle records:

b6
b7C



~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-05-2012 BY 60322~~

XEROX

JUL 1 1974

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-05-2012 BY 60322~~

105-247904-32

ENCLOSURE

Republic Of Korea Intelligence Activities In The
United States

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

Attached to this memorandum is a copy of one
of the English leaflets passed out at the rally.

(U) Files of the New York Office of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation reflect no information identifiable to any of the
above individuals. (S)

(U) The current edition of the Register of the Society of
Foreign Consulates in New York City reflects that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

KOREAN COMMITTEE FOR RETURN OF ABDUCTED FISHERMEN

April 27, 1974

A N N O U N C E M E N T


Following numerous maritime violations over a period of four months, North Korean naval forces launched a murderous and totally unprovoked attack upon two unarmed South Korean boats fishing on the high seas. In the attack, which took place February 15, 1974, one boat was immediately sunk and 13 crewmen killed or drowned, in spite of the fact they could not have successfully resisted even an ordinary stop-and-search procedure and 15 others in the remaining boat were abducted to the North Korea. To compound this affront to common humanity, North Korea has displayed an almost adolescent disdain of International comity and of the law between civilized nations in its treatment of the tragedy. Rather than apologizing for a patent error, it has elected to dishonor itself further with fumbling excuses about "spy" ships, the established facts notwithstanding.

The so-called "spy" ships were two, venerable, 15-year-old, 80 ton fishing boats rigged for drag net fishing and capable of 8 knots top speed. They were manned by family men well known in their communities for having spent their entire lives as simple fishermen -- not as technical engineers of electronic surveillance. As customary, each boat carried a small radio transmitter-receiver and periodically reported their position in plain language broadcasts to Inchon, their home port.

In view of such inexcusable behavior, 200,000 Korean-Americans speak out with one voice, in the name of friendship to your people and to your government, to ask for your support and cooperation in their effort to persuade

- 1) North Korea to return immediately these abducted fathers, husbands, sons and brothers to their grieving families awaiting them in the South.
- 2) North Korea to pay reparations to the bereaved families of the innocent victims who were so wantonly slaughtered by North Korean Naval forces.
- 3) North Korea to pay for the boat it sunk during its unprovoked attack and return the remaining fishing boat to its rightful owners.
- 4) North Korea to deeply apologize for the tragic results of the savage behavior of those who represented it in this incident.
- 5) North Korea to resume without further subterfuge the peace talks which it had previously acceded to and which are aimed at the eventual unification of all of Korea.

Respectfully yours,



John Ilhack Kim
Chairman

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-24-86 BY SP-1/1/1/1

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (97-392) (P)

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

DATE: 7/8/74

b6
b7c

Re San Francisco letter to Bureau, dated 5/31/74.

On 7/2/74, an unknown [redacted] at [redacted] advised Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] is currently in [redacted] and has either visited or will visit [redacted] and will not return to [redacted] until [redacted]. It is noted that [redacted]

It is also noted [redacted] residence is located in [redacted]

On the same date, efforts to locate [redacted] at his place of business, [redacted] and his residence, [redacted] were unsuccessful.

On 7/3/74, inquiry at [redacted] disclosed that it is [redacted]. An unknown female [redacted] advised that [redacted] left the [redacted] sometime in [redacted]

[redacted] was usually unavailable, spending considerable time in the Far East. [redacted] were unable to reach him as part of [redacted]

San Francisco will continue efforts to locate and interview [redacted] and will interview [redacted]. Bureau will be advised.

- 2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - San Francisco

HLM/crv

(3)

54 JUL 17 1974

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



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DATE 8-28-96 BY SP3 BJA/pax

ST-114 REG-1 105-247904-35

JUL 10 1974

FIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

4

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-130017) (P)

SUBJECT: ROK INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
RA - SOUTH KOREA

DATE: JUL 19 1974

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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 04-05-2012

ReWFOlet to Bureau dated 1/22/74; Nynitel to Bureau dated 6/28/74.

(U) ReWFOlet advised that three ROK, CIA representatives are currently in NYC. (S)

NYO notes that [REDACTED]

b7D

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REC-26

EX-111

105-247904-36

- ② - Bureau (RM)
- 2 - Washington Field (RM)
- 1 - New York

JUL 22 1974

RAM:lap
(5)

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

APR 17 1975

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

DATE: 7/31/74

FROM : SAC, WFO (97-2034)(P)

~~SECRET~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 05-03-2012

SUBJECT: ROK INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE U. S.
RA - SOUTH KOREA

Re New York letter to the Bureau dated
7/19/74.

On 7/18/74, [redacted] advised SA [redacted]
[redacted] that he is not cognizant concerning the identities
of current ROKCIA personnel currently assigned to the
New York area if they differ from the names of those
previously furnished: [redacted]

He
advised that he would attempt to obtain additional
information concerning this matter. (cf WFOlet and LHM,
9/4/73, captioned as above.)

For the information of the New York Office.

[redacted] however, at this time only information
volunteered by this source is being accepted.

Any information coming to the attention of WFO
concerning this matter will be immediately brought to the
attention of the Bureau and the New York Office.

This letter is classified "~~Secret~~" [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 7366
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

REC-74 105-247904-37

- 2 - Bureau
- 2 - New York (105-130017)
- 2 - WFO

(1) [redacted]

LJTR:nsu
(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

21 AUG 1 1974

APR 1 1974

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

(Copies to Offices Checked)

To: ☒ Director, Att.:
☒ SAC,

38

☐ Albany
☐ Albuquerque
☐ Alexandria
☐ Anchorage
☐ Atlanta
☐ Baltimore
☐ Birmingham
☐ Boston
☐ Buffalo
☐ Butte
☐ Charlotte
☐ Chicago
☐ Cincinnati
☐ Cleveland
☐ Columbia
☐ Dallas
☐ Denver
☐ Detroit
☐ El Paso
☐ Honolulu

☐ Houston
☐ Indianapolis
☐ Jackson
☐ Jacksonville
☐ Kansas City
☐ Knoxville
☐ Las Vegas
☐ Little Rock
☐ Los Angeles
☐ Louisville
☐ Memphis
☐ Miami
☐ Milwaukee
☐ Minneapolis
☐ Mobile
☐ Newark
☐ New Haven
☐ New Orleans
☐ New York City
☐ Norfolk

☐ Oklahoma City
☐ Omaha
☐ Philadelphia
☐ Phoenix
☐ Pittsburgh
☐ Portland
☐ Richmond
☐ Sacramento
☐ St. Louis
☐ Salt Lake City
☐ San Antonio
☐ San Diego
☐ San Francisco
☐ San Juan
☐ Savannah
☐ Seattle
☐ Springfield
☐ Tampa
☒ Washington Field

Date 7/19/74

RE: **REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA
OO: WFO**

REMARKS

Re Bulet to New York, dated 4/10/74, with
triple caption including above.

Enclosed for information of WFO are the
following pertinent communications not pre-
viously furnished WFO per instructions in
relet:

San Francisco letter to Bureau, 5/31/74.
San Francisco letter to Bureau, 7/8/74.

BU 105-247904 (RM)
FILE #: WFO 97-2034 (Enc. 2) SAC CHARLES W. BATES
(RM) OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO
SF 97-392

105-247904-

NOT RECORDED

9 JUL 23 1974

279
57 JUL 29 1974

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/29/96 BY SP4BAP/RE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

DATE: 8/5/74

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (97-392) (P)

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S.

REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

OO: WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

b6
b7C

Re San Francisco letter to the Bureau dated 7/8/74.

On 7/26/74, and 7/31/74, efforts to locate and interview [redacted] at his place of business [redacted] and his residence [redacted] were met with negative results.

San Francisco will continue efforts to locate and interview [redacted] and will interview [redacted]

Bureau will be advised.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-22-86 BY SP-5/SP-6

EX-101

REC-52

105-247904-38

AUG 8 1974

- ② - Bureau (RM)
2 - Washington Field (RM)
2 - San Francisco
SSM:tlp
(6)



5 AUG 14 1974

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1-human)
DATE 04-05-2012

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

DATE: 9/17/74

FROM : SAC, WFO (97-2034) (P)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: ROK INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
RA-SOUTH KOREA
(OO:WFO)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Classified by 948
Declassify on: OADR

Re WFOlet to the Bureau, 7/31/74.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are five copies
and for the New York Office two copies of an LHM dated
and captioned as above. Also enclosed for the New York
Office is one photograph of [redacted] obtained from the
files of the Protocol Office, U. S. Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

b6
b7C

(U) [The enclosed LHM is classified "Confidential" as
it discloses FBI investigative interest in foreign diplomatic
personnel.]

(C) [WF T-1 is former [redacted]]

b1

The New York Office should attempt to further
identify [redacted] and furnish pertinent information to
the Bureau and WFO. For the information of the New York
Office, WFO has noted that it appears to be a common practice
for [redacted]

b6
b7C

WFO will continue to follow this matter and
report pertinent details.

- 2- Bureau (Enc. 5) ENCLOSURE
2- New York (105-130017)
(Enc. 3)
1- WFO
LJT:dah

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By 1366
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

REC-112

105-247904-41
22 SEP 17 1974





ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C. 20535

September 17, 1974

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION

AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:


FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1-human)

DATE 04-05-2012

**IC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
INTERNAL SECURITY - SOUTH KOREA**

b1



(C) On August 26, 1974, a representative of the Office of Protocol, United States Department of State, Washington, D. C., made available a copy of a "Notification of Status With a Foreign Government" form dated [redacted] and submitted to that office by the Embassy of South Korea, Washington, D. C., for one [redacted]. The following information was obtained from that form:


b6
b7C

Name:
Date of Birth:
Place of Birth:
Nationality:
Date of Entry:
Place of Entry:

Status:
Agency:

Employment Past Five
Years:

Home Address:



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By 7366
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

92-286
Classified by [signature]
Declassify on: OADR

ENCLOSURE

105-2479-41


REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Family:

A large rectangular box used to redact information, likely a family name or address.

Domestic employee:

Additionally, the representative of the Protocol Office advised that no record pertaining to  could be located in the files of that office.

A large rectangular box used to redact a significant portion of the document's content.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (105-247904)

DATE: 9/23/74

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (97-392) (P)

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN
THE UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA
OO:WFO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-22-86 BY SP488/pne

ReSFlet to Bureau, 8/5/74.

Continued efforts to locate [redacted] at his place of business, [redacted] and his place of residence, [redacted] were met with negative results.

b6
b7C

On 8/26/74, a neighborhood investigation in the vicinity of [redacted] disclosed that the above address, which was [redacted] is currently vacant. Subsequent investigation disclosed that [redacted] is now relocated at [redacted]. Efforts to locate [redacted] at his new place of business were met with negative results.

On 9/11/74, [redacted] advised [redacted] continues to reside at [redacted] but hardly spends much time at his apartment. [redacted] ascertained that he knows [redacted] on a casual basis, inasmuch as they are [redacted] but has no idea as to where [redacted] is employed or of his activities. [redacted] advised that he has not seen [redacted] since the Labor Day weekend in September, 1974.

On 9/18/74, [redacted] advised [redacted] left for the Republic of Korea on [redacted] 74, for three or four weeks and will not be expected back in [redacted] until latter part of [redacted] 1974. [redacted] stated [redacted] spend most of their time in [redacted]

- ② - Bureau *ed*
- 2 - WFO
- 2 - San Francisco

SSM:eib

58 OCT 3 1974 232

9 SEP 25 1974

FIVE

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



SF 97-392
SSM:eib

b6
b7C

Korea, inasmuch as [redacted]
advised that the only reason they come to [redacted] is
to spend some time with [redacted]

[redacted] commented
that [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] advised [redacted] will have [redacted] contact the FBI Of-
fice upon his return from Korea.

San Francisco will continue efforts to locate and
interview [redacted] and will interview [redacted] fol-
lowing his return from Korea.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1-human)
DATE 04-05-2012

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

DATE: 10/23/74

FROM : SAC, WFO (97-2034) (P)

Classified by ~~92386~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Republic Of Korea
ROK INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
RA - SOUTH KOREA
(OO: WFO)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Re WFO letter and LHM, 9/17/74, and Bureau letter
to Los Angeles, 9/3/74.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are five copies, -
and for Los Angeles and New York, two copies each, of an LHM
dated and captioned as above. Also enclosed for Los Angeles
and New York are copies of USDS forms "Notification of Status
With A Foreign Government" pertaining to and photographs of
[redacted] respectively.
These items were obtained from the files of the Protocol Office,
USDS, WDC.

The enclosed LHM is classified "Confidential" as it
discloses FBI investigative interest in foreign diplomatic
personnel.

WF T-1 is [redacted]

b1

Los Angeles and New York will conduct necessary in-
quiry concerning captioned matter and make appropriate recommen-
dations to the Bureau as to possible further investigation deemed
warranted in this matter relating to ROKCIA activity in their
respective territories.

WFO will follow this matter and report pertinent
information.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EX-117

Classified by 7366
Exempt from GDS Category 2 and 3
Date of Declassification - Indefinite

REC-19

OCT 24 1974

- (2) - Bureau (Enc. 5)
- 2 - Los Angeles (97-383) (Enc. 6)
- 2 - New York (105-130017) (Enc. 4)
- 1 - WFO

2. AMG. Div. 11-1-74

LJT:pkh

(7)

JAN 17 1975

U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

DOC. CLASS.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C. 20535

October 23, 1974

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1-human)
DATE 04-05-2012

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
INTERNAL SECURITY - SOUTH KOREA

b1

(C)

On October 18, 1974, a representative of the Office of Protocol, United States Department of State, Washington, D. C., made available for review their files pertaining to the above individuals.

By "Notification of Status With a Foreign Government" forms submitted to U. S. Department of State (USDS) by the Embassy of South Korea on [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] respectively, the following information was obtained:

Name:
Nationality:
Date and Place of birth:
Date and Place of entry:
Title or Rank:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 7866
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 and 3
Date of Declassification - Indefinite

~~Classified by 7866~~
~~Declassify on OADR~~

105-247904-45
ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 11/13/74

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (97-395) (C)




b6
b7C




SUBJECT: 

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-23-80 BY SP4900/mce

*the
group*
Re San Francisco letter to the Bureau, dated 9/23/74,
captioned REPUBLIC OF KOREA, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES, REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA, OO: WFO.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are six copies of
an LHM dated and captioned as above. Information copy is
being furnished to WFO. One copy of enclosed LHM is being
furnished to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
San Francisco.

The interview of 
California, referred to in the enclosed LHM was conducted by
SAs  and 

It is noted that allegations were made by members
of the Korean community  was involved in
Korean CIA activities to harass individuals opposed to the
PARK regime. However, investigation to date fails to sub-
stantiate either direct or indirect involvement by 
 concerning Korean CIA activities.

In view of the above information, it is felt that
no further investigation concerning the above captioned
Subject is warranted at this time.

ENCLOSURE

REC-11

105-247904-47

2 - Bureau (Enc. 6) (RM)
(1 - 105-247904)

1 - WFO (97-20034) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)

2 - San Francisco (97-395)
(1 - 97-392)

SSM/kdn

(5)

*1 cc encl CIA/Coastal
State, All of Orin Div
11-20-74 JPD/sep*

NOV 18 1974

ST 103

FIVE



58 NOV 21 1974

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

1 - [REDACTED]

SAC, San Francisco (97-392)

1/7/75

Director, FBI (105-247904) - 48

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

Reurlet 11/25/74.

You are authorized to interview [REDACTED]
The interview is to be conducted [REDACTED] and he is to be
advised the FBI is not interested in legitimate [REDACTED]
matters. Bufiles contain no information concerning him
additional to that available to you. Furnish results in
form suitable for dissemination.

1 - WFO (97-2034)


HLD:mjg
(5)NOTE:

Investigation was initiated at State Department request
following allegations in the press that ROK CIA agents were
harassing ROK residents of the U. S. [REDACTED] was developed as a
suspect in the matter due to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bureau letter 3/6/74, authorized
San Francisco to interview [REDACTED] but denied authority to interview
[REDACTED] until additional background data had been developed.
Referenced letter set forth such data. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Investigation and
interview of [REDACTED] did not substantiate his alleged involvement
with ROK CIA. Interview of [REDACTED] will afford an opportunity to
further apprise results of investigation of [REDACTED]

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____



58 JAN 1975

MAIL ROOM []

TELETYPE UNIT []

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

DATE: 11/25/74

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (97-392) (P)

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE U.S.
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA
OO: WFO

Re San Francisco letter to the Bureau dated
9/23/74.

b6
b7C

On 10/10/74, a recheck of INS records by [redacted]
[redacted] Security Clerk, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 630 Sansome Street, San Francisco, revealed no
identifiable information concerning [redacted]

On 10/15/74, a search of records at the Registrar's
Office, University of San Francisco, indicated that [redacted]

The file further revealed

[redacted] is currently [redacted]

The file also disclosed the following
information:

Name:

DOB:

POB:

Current Address:

- ② - Bureau
- 1 - WFO (Info)
- 6 - San Francisco
- (2 - 97-392)
- (2 - 97-393)
- (2 - 97-394)

SSM/pkv (S-7)
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-22-86 BY [signature]

REC-61

105-247904-48

21 DEC 4 1974

FILED



SF 97-392
SSM/pkv

b6
b7C

On 10/22/74, the records at the California Department of Motor Vehicles, Sacramento, California, revealed the following information concerning [redacted]

Name:
DOB:
Height:
Weight:
Eyes:
Hair:
Sex:
Driver's License #:
Address:

[Redacted box for personal information]

SSAN:

[redacted]
On 10/24/74 and 11/6/74, [redacted] was
contacted at [redacted] place of residence. [redacted]
[redacted] advised that [redacted]
has not yet returned from South Korea. [redacted] stated [redacted]
had received a phone call from [redacted] about [redacted] ago
advising [redacted] that he will not be back [redacted] until
the latter part of [redacted]

Inasmuch as additional background information
concerning [redacted] has been obtained, San Francisco
is requesting Bureau authority to interview [redacted]
The interview will be aimed to determine his exact relationship,
if any, with the ROK Government.

LEAD

SAN FRANCISCO

AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA. Will interview
[redacted] upon his return from South Korea to determine
his relationship, if any, with the ROK Government.

1 - [redacted]

ADIC, New York (105-130017)

December 13, 1974

REC-37

Director, FBI (105-247904) — 50

**ROK INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
RA-SOUTH KOREA**

Re New York letters dated 8-19-74 and 12-6-74.

For St

Concerning New York's request that Bureau translator, [redacted] submit his comments concerning various prominent ethnic Koreans in the New York metropolitan area, this is to advise that [redacted] Information furnished by him concerning other individuals is based, for the most part, on what he has gleaned from reading Korean newspapers. Requested information is set forth below:

1. [redacted]

Address [redacted]

Telephone Number: [redacted]

MAILED R

DEC 13 1974

FBI

1 - Mr. Wannall, Attn: CI-3, sent direct

GTB:pwm (5)

56 JAN 19 1975

TELETYPE UNIT []


9-27-86

[Handwritten signature]

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Letter to New York
Re: ROK INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
RA - SOUTH KOREA
105-247904

b6
b7C



*KIM Dae-jung (K), [redacted] was the unsuccessful
opposition candidate for the South Korean presidential
election in 1971. He was kidnapped in 1973 from Tokyo
to Seoul, allegedly by Korean CIA agents.

b7E

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)
(ATTN: FBI LABORATORY)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-130017) (P*)
Republic of Korea

SUBJECT: ROK INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
RA-SOUTH KOREA

10/24

DATE: 12/6/74

Borgmeyer

ReNYlet to Bu, dated 8/19/74.

ReNYlet requested the Bureau Laboratory Translator to submit his comments concerning various prominent ethnic Koreans in the NYC area. To date, no reply has been received.

The NYO has opened individual case files on suspected ROK CIA Agents and leading pro-ROK ethnic Koreans in the NYC area; thus negating the necessity for instant file to be in pending status.

The NYO will maintain this matter in a pending inactive status, until reply from the Bureau Laboratory is received.

W

let to ADIC, NY
GTB/pwm
12/13/74

REC-37

105-247904-50

EX-103

14 DEC 12 1974

- ② - Bureau (RM)
(1 - FBI Laboratory)
- 1 - New York

RAM:bjh
(3)

~~CRYPTO SECT~~

~~FILE~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-24-86 BY SPY/CMR



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)
ATTN: (FBI LABORATORY)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-130017) (P)
Republic of Korea

SUBJECT: ROK INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE US
RA-SOUTH KOREA

DATE: 8/19/74

Yes
ReNYlet to Bureau, dated 6/18/74; NYlet to Bureau, dated 6/17/74 captioned "WASHINGTON AREA KOREAN STUDENTS ASSOCIATION".

ReNYlets advised the Bureau that new cases were being opened at the NYO concerning ethnic Koreans in the NYC area active in various organizations both pro and anti-PAK Chong-hui. It is hoped that some of these will offer source potential for coverage of all facets of Korean activities in New York City.

NYO notes that the Bulab Korean translator has in the past exhibited extensive knowledge of ethnic Koreans in the New York City area. Accordingly, the Bureau is requested to solicit the Bulab Korean translator's comments regarding the background (residence, employment and education); ideology, trustworthiness, and any other pertinent information regarding the following individuals:

1.

2.

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 9-22-86 BY SP4 RUM/mtg

EX-103

REC-37

105-247904-51

(3- Bureau (RM)
(1- FBI Lab)
1- New York

RAM:em
(5)

*Let to ADIC, NY
GVB/pwm
12/13/74*

2 AUG 23 1974

CRYPTO SECT

FIVE




1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NY 105-130017

b6
b7C



NYO also notes that INS checks regarding several of the above individuals have been negative. The Bulab is requested, therefore, to furnish additional variations of the above names that may also be utilized by them.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

FROM : *[Signature]* SAC, NEW YORK (105-130017) (C)

SUBJECT: *[Signature]*
ROK INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES IN THE US
RA-SOUTH KOREA

DATE: FEB 5 1975

ReNYlet to Bu, dated 12/6/74; Bulet to NY, dated 12/13/74.

Reference NY letter of 8/19/74, set out lead for the Bureau Laboratory regarding this matter. Reference Bureau letter reported results of this lead.

The NYO has opened individual case files on suspected ROK CIA Agents and leading pro-ROK ethnic Koreans in the NYC area, thus negating the necessity for instant file to be in a pending status. Accordingly, this matter is being closed at the NYO; however, the NYO will remain alert through the other outstanding cases of any untoward activities of the ROK CIA in the NYC area.

EX-110

REC-1

105-247904-52

FEB 7 1975

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York

RAM:mm
(3)



F364

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

57 FEB 14 1975

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT



Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

DATE: 1/29/75

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (97-393) (C)



SUBJECT: 

CC TO: 
REQ. REC'D S-5-7
MAY 19 1977
ANS.
BY: WRS/Lmc
Re: 

Re San Francisco letter to Bureau dated 11/25/74 captioned "Republic of Korea, Intelligence Activities in the United States, Registration Act, South Korea, OO: WFO".

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are six (6) copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above. Information copy is being furnished to Washington Field. One copy of enclosed LHM is being furnished to Immigration and Naturalization Service, San Francisco.

The interview of  reflected in the enclosed LHM, was conducted by SAs  and 

It is noted that  has been alleged to be an operative of the Republic of Korea, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); however, investigation to date fails to substantiate any involvement on the part of  concerning Korean CIA activities.

SF T-1 utilized in the attached LHM is identified on the Nonsymbol Source Page.

V-15

In view of the above information, it is felt that no further investigation concerning the above captioned Subject is warranted at this time.

- ② - Bureau (Enc. 6) (RM)
1 - WFO (97-20034) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - San Francisco
(1 - 97-392)

SSM/sih
(5)

*100 CIA (courier), 2. and
AAG-Vin Dai HA 2.14.75 JWH/2ep*



5010-110

8 FEB 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5 FEB 10 1975

EX-112

105-247904-54

SF 97-393
SSM/sih

b6
b7C
b7D

NONSYMBOL SOURCE PAGE

SF T-1 is [redacted]
[redacted] (protect identity
at his request).



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Francisco, California

January 29, 1975

b6
b7c

[REDACTED]

On August 29, 1973, SF T-1, a person who is in a position of respect in the Korean Community [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] has been alleged to be an operative of the Republic of Korea Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

On [REDACTED] 1974, [REDACTED] was interviewed at his place of residence, [REDACTED] by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and provided the following information:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-28-86 BY [REDACTED]

100-241704-59

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

b6
b7C

[redacted] concluded the interview by stating that he is happy that the United States Government admitted he and [redacted] to the country and strongly commented to the fact that he would in no way jeopardize his stay in the United States by engaging himself in pro-Park Regime activities.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1-human)
DATE 04-05-2012

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

DATE 3/6/75
~~SECRET~~

FROM : SAC, WFO (97-2034) (P)

SUBJECT: ROK INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
IS-SOUTH KOREA
RA-SOUTH KOREA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

9-23-86
Classified in ~~FOUO~~
Declassify on: OADR

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are five copies, for San Francisco, two copies, for Los Angeles, two copies, and New York, one copy for information, of an LHM dated and captioned as above. Also enclosed for San Francisco are one photograph of [redacted] and copy of United States Department of State (USDS) form DS 394 "Notification of Status With A Foreign Government" pertaining to [redacted] both obtained from the files of the Protocol Office, USDS, Washington, D.C. (WDC).

(U) The LHM is classified "~~Secret~~" to protect a sensitive source of continuing value. The LHM would other wise be classified "~~Confidential~~" inasmuch as it shows FBI investigation interest [redacted] b6 b7C

(C) WF T-1 and WF T-2 are [redacted] b1 b7E

(U) The [redacted] Office currently has under investigation the matter of [redacted] identified as [redacted] and additional information resulting from that investigation should be set forth in form suitable for dissemination under his individual caption. *Mg* b6 b7C

The San Francisco Office should verify [redacted] presence and make appropriate recommendations to the Bureau for any further action deemed warranted in that matter.

WFO will continue to follow captioned matter and report pertinent information. 105-247904-55
REC-7 16 MAR 11 1975

- 2 - Bureau (Enc. 5)
- 2 - Los Angeles (97-382) (1-105-3955)
- 1 - New York (105-130017)
- 2 - San Francisco
- 2 - WFO

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 7386
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

(C) LJT:rgl
19 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


Washington, D. C. 20535
March 6, 1975

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
INTERNAL SECURITY - SOUTH KOREA

(C)



b1

On February 21, 1975, a representative of the Protocol Office, U.S. Department of State (USDS), Washington, D.C. (WDC) advised that according to records of that office,

[redacted] born [redacted] arrived
in the United States on [redacted] at [redacted]
on [redacted] visa [redacted]

b6
b7C



(C)



b1

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1-human)
DATE 04-05-2012

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 7366
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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recommendations nor conclusions of
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it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

105-247904-55



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

105-247964-56
CHANGED TO
105-274490-3

MAY 09 1975

fx/Bl

163

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-10-86 BY SP4/ewj/mce

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 4-2-75

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (97-392) (RUC)

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA
OO: Washington Field

Re Bureau letter to San Francisco, dated 1-7-75, captioned "REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA, OO: Washington Field", and San Francisco letter to the Bureau, dated 2-19-75, captioned [redacted] OO: San Francisco." b6 b7C

Inasmuch as all subjects concerning the above-captioned matter have been interviewed and results of investigation have been reported to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination, no further investigation is being contemplated by the San Francisco Division. 40

REC-10 105-24790-57

ST-112

41 APR 7 1975

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - WFO (Info) (RM)
1 - San Francisco
SSM:ert
(4)

WILLIAM
WILLIAM



5010-110

121
54 APR 14 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Classification per OGA letter dated 4/9/12 & 5/12/12.

Date: 4/2/75

(S)

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL

AIR MAIL
(Priority)

FOI/TA 100-1053

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE 12/3/86

BY 92384

b1

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)
FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (97-383) (P)
SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

Photo ~~SECRET~~ (S-1)

REQ. REC'D 10-15-87

NOV 2 1985

ANS

BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] classified ~~secret~~ to protect [redacted]
The Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) is
classified confidential as it reveals
out interest in foreign diplomatic
personnel.

b7D

b1

Transmitted herewith for the Bureau are seven copies
of a LHM. Two copies are enclosed for Washington Field. Also
enclosed for the Bureau is [redacted]

b1

[redacted] mentioned in attached LHM.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] advised [redacted]
[redacted] would be afraid and would not talk about contact with
Los Angeles feels he should be interviewed.
He will be identified and interviewed on a UACB basis.

ENCLOSURE

- 4 - Bureau (Enc. 8) (RM) REC-53
- 2 - 105-278458
- 2 - Washington Field (97-2034) (RM) (Enc. 2)
- 2 - Los Angeles
- (1 - 105-39551)

EX-110

15 APR 7 1975

~~SECRET~~

FILE

JEW/dw
(8)

CLASSIFIED BY 2182
EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON indefinite

DOC. CLASS.

Approved:

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

M

Per

11/24/78

b7D

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (139-279) (RUC)

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C



OKORIAN (C) 1/1/79
Agency

Revised to Director dated 11/10/78. (U)

WFO indices do not contain any reference to New York teletype dated 3/22/78. (U)

With regard to [redacted] WFO indices show [redacted] submitted an airtel dated 5/8/78 captioned [redacted], "setting out background on [redacted] WFO indices are otherwise negative regarding [redacted] (U)

Matter RUC at WFO.

~~9-23-84~~
~~Sp48wpre~~
~~266053~~

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 8040
Exempt from GDS, Cat
Date of Declassification

- 3 - Bureau (1)
- 4 - New York (2)
- 4 - Newark (1)
- 2 - WFO (1)

DWG:lat
(13)

ORIGINAL FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C
b7D


LA 97-383

[redacted] were concerned about [redacted]
[redacted] Koreans apparently from the Consulate [redacted]
[redacted] advising
the Admiral had been returned to Korea with the visit of the
[redacted] Koreans. While it is doubtful that the Korean Central
Intelligence Agency (KCIA) would attempt a kidnaping in the
United States, the circumstances do raise questions as to their
intentions. [redacted]
[redacted]

Washington Field should obtain photographs of the
[redacted]
[redacted]

(U)

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Los Angeles, California

April 2, 1975

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 04-16-2012
Classification per OGA letter dated
4/9/12.

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OTHERWISE

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

On March 4, 1975, Sam Joo Lee, Editor in Chief,
"The Korean Central Daily News", 1116 West Olympic Boulevard,
Los Angeles, California, advised Los Angeles now has the
largest Korean community in the United States. Recently,
North Korean propaganda has been received by members of the
Los Angeles Korean Community. The newspaper decided to carry
a story about the increase in propaganda and what a recipient
could do about it. He spoke with a [redacted] at the Republic
of Korea (ROK) Consulate in Los Angeles whom he understood
was responsible for intelligence. [redacted] told him the Consulate
had requested that literature received by members of the
community be turned over to the Consulate. They averaged about
100 items a month and at the end of the year this increased to
about 300 items during a one month period.

b6
b7C

On March 21, 1975 [redacted]

[redacted] advised

he is [redacted] and resides [redacted]

[redacted] Admiral Lee, Young Woon who
until 1967 was Chief of Staff of the South Korean Navy. [redacted]

Vietnam Calif.
JAPAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b1

FOI/PA # 206053

APPEAL #

CIVILASE. #

U.O. # 12356

DATE 9-23-86 INITIALS [redacted]

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
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105-247904-58
ENCLOSURE

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b6
b7c

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

[REDACTED]

Admiral Lee is an outspoken critic of South Korean President Park Chung Hee. He has been interviewed by a number of newspapers including the "New York Times". He has known President Park for many years. He had a brother who was a General in the South Korean Army. His brother was killed in a plane crash in 1952. Park was on the brother's staff. According to Admiral Lee, at one time Park had been an ardent Communist. He was discovered and to save himself, he named all of the members of his conspiracy. As a result, all except Park, including his brother, were executed. After Park took power, Admiral Lee continued as Chief of Staff of the Navy. He was critical of Park and finally in 1967, Park had him court-martialed for corruption. He was demoted and spent two years in jail. After his release, Park had him reinstated as a Reserve Admiral in the Navy.

[REDACTED] and after the Admiral's release, they traveled to Viet Nam where they operated a scrap metal business. He traveled to Viet Nam on a diplomatic passport. While in Viet Nam, representatives of the KCIA convinced him to travel to Japan. After his arrival in Japan, he was taken to Korea. While he was detained in Korea, the KCIA people took over his scrap metal business in Viet Nam. Eventually, he was able to leave Korea. He returned to Viet Nam and opened a new scrap metal business. He also purchased a small steamship which operates along the coast. He was able to obtain enough money to live comfortably.

Admiral Lee owns the Glenn Valley Motel. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Admiral Lee was in the United States with a visitor visa but returned to Japan on March 18, 1975. He has applied for immigrant status with the United States Embassy in Japan. He returned to Japan because of his business interest in that country and also to continue his efforts to gain admission to the United States. While in Japan, the police provided him with a 20 man bodyguard.

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b6
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REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

During [redacted] 1975, a group from the Korean Democratic Club (KDC), lead by [redacted] was in Los Angeles and [redacted]
[redacted] The KDC is anti-Park. They knew of [redacted]
[redacted] and apparently felt [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

b6
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[redacted] representatives from the Korean Consulate came [redacted] and tried unsuccessfully to get the group [redacted] closer to the Consulate. [redacted]

[redacted] About two years ago, Kim Dea Joong, who had been an unsuccessful candidate opposing President Park, was kidnapped in Japan and taken to Korea. At that time, Kim Jea Kon was in charge of the KCIA in Japan and it was the KCIA who engineered the kidnapping. [redacted] was told that Kim Dea Joong met with several Korean Senators in Japan. A couple of KCIA people were also in attendance at that meeting. At the conclusion of the meeting, the KCIA people asked the Senators to leave as they had a message for Kim. After the Senators left, they used chloroform to subdue Kim. He was placed in a bag, carried to the trunk of an automobile, and left Japan in a boat. They intended to throw him overboard in international waters. [redacted]

b1

(C)

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